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Senator Ray B. Danks 
Colo"rado Legislative Council 
Denver 2, Colorado 
Dear Senator Danks: 
December 17, 1958 
Transmitted herewith is the report of the Legislative Council Committee 
on Public Employees' Retirement appointed pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 
No. 6 (1958). This report covers the committee's study and evaluation of the 
retirement program of the Public Employees' Retirement Association (P. E. R. A.) 
as well as actuarial evaluations and discussion of several methods of combining 
P.E.R.A. with Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Program (O.A.S.D.I.). 
The committee wishes to express its appreciation for the assistance 
rendered to the committee by: the actuarial firm of Coates, Hurfurth and England; 
Mr. F. Leighton Exel; Mr. A. C. Gabriel; Mr. Raymond J. Heath; Mr. Jack 
Kennedy; and the Council staff. 
DC:mrl 
Sincerely yours, 
/s/ Representative Dewey Carnahan 
Chairman 









H.J. R. No. 42 (1957) directed the Legislative Council to study the problems 
of public employee retirement with specific instructions to determine the feasibility 
of combining P. E. R. A. with social security (O. A. S. D. I.). 
A preliminary report was issued by the Legislative Council to the second 
regular session of the 41 st General Assembly. That report concluded that it is 
feasible to combine P. E. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I. 
At the second regular session of the 41st General Assembly S.J. R. No. 6 
was passed which instructed the Legislative Council to continue to study public 
employee retirement problems with particular reference to proposing specific plans 
for combining P. E. R. A. and 0, A. S. D. I. 
The Chairman of the Legislative Council appointed a committee to carry 
our the provisions of this resolution. Those committee members were: 
Representative Dewey Carnahan, Chairman; Representatives Luther Bean and 
Gale Sellens; and Senators Hestia Wilson and James E. Donnelly. 
One of the first problems that the committee faced was the necessity of 
securing actuarial evaluations of alternative combination plans. Since funds were 
not available to secure an independent actuarial study, arrangements were made with 
the P. E. R. A. Board of Directors to have A. C. Gabriel, the P, E. R. A. actuary, to 
evaluate the proposed plans. That service was provided by P. E. R. A. at a cost of 
$5,475. In that connection, the P. E. R. A. board, Mr. Raymond J. Heath, Mr. Jack 
Kennedy and Mr. A. C. Gabriel generously cooperated with the committee and the 
staff throughout this study. 
The actuarial firm of Coates, Hurfurth and England has served as an 
unpaid consultant to the committee throughout the study. That firm assigned 
Mr. F. Leighton Exel to work with the committee and his coonsel and guidance has 
been of immeasurable value to the committee and the staff. 
Harry 0. Lawson, Senior Analyst, is the Council staff member who has 
had the major research responsibility for this report. 
This report was not completed in time for the 1957-1958 Legislative Council 
to review, Since a new Council has not been appointed, the interim Chairman of the 
Legislative Council instructed the committee to issue its report to the General 
Assembly as a committ· ee report in order that the General Assembly may have ready 
access to the results of the study. 
December 17, 1958 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND COMMITTBB RBCOMMBNDATIONS 
Findin_£ 
The Public Employees Retirement Association (P;B. R. A.) provides retirement 
coverage for some 27,000 Colorado employees in public service. These include 11,288 
state employees, 14,489 schpol employees, 1, 129 municipal employees, and 77 judges. 
Three other retirement systems provide coverage for some of Colorado's public employees. 
The City and County of Denver school district employees have their own retirement 
system, as do the employees of the Denver Water Board. The faculty of the University of 
Colorado is covered by the Teachers' Annuity Insurance Association. Both the Denver 
Water Board employees and the University of Colorado faculty have combined their 
retirement systems with social security (0. A. S. D. I.). County employees and the 
majority of municipal employees are covered by 0. A. S. D. I. only. 
P. B. R. A. Benefits 
From the average employee's point of view, P. E • R. A. is a very satisfactory 
retirement plan. With 20 years' service at age 65, he receives a retirement annuity equal 
to one-half of his highest average salary for any consecutive five of the last ten years of 
service. Early retirement is allowed for 35 years' service at any age, 30 years' service 
at age 55 (35 years for school employees), and 20 years' service at age 60. Upon early 
retirement, an employee is eligible for an annuity equal to one-half his final average 
salary or $300 per month, whichever is less. 
Additional benefits under P. E. R. A. include disability retirement, survivorship 
benefits, death benefits, and deferred annuities. An employee with five years of P. B. R. A. -
covered service is entitled to one-half of his monthly salary if he becomes permanently 
disabled on the job. If he has 15 years of service, he is entitled to a full retirement 
annuity if he has a non-employment permanent disability. 
Survivorship benefits are provided for the spouse and children of a deceased member 
who has five years of covered service. Prior to completing his five years of service, he 
may choose to avail himself of group insurance coverage at a nominal monthly charge. In 
the event that a member dies before he is eligible either for retirement or for survivorship 
benefits, his beneficiary receives a lump sum refund of the contributions he has made to 
P. B. R. A. If he dies after he is eligible for retirement, his beneficiary will receive a 
reduced monthly annuity for the remainer of his or her life. 
Members leaving P. E. R. A. -covered service after five years or more may leave 
their retirement deposits in the sy.stern until age 65, at which time they will receive a 
deferred annuity based on 2. 5 per cent of final average salary multiplied by the number of 
years of covered service, not to exceed 20. 
V 
Colorado State Patrol employees and the judges who are members of the P. B. R. A, 
judges' division have slightly different annuity benefit formulae, but are eligible for all 
other P. B. R. A. benefits. 
P. B. R.A. members get a very high return per dollar of contribution, and the rate 
of contribution is not excessive. A 11 P. B. R.A. members except the state highway patrol 
contribute six per cent of salary. Because of more costly benefits, members of the state 
highway patrol contribute at a seven per cent rate. The employer also contributes at a 
six per cent rate for all members except the state highway patrol and judges. The 
employer contributes seven per cent for highway patrol members and 12 per cent for 
Judges, again because of more costly annuity benefits. 
Whlle P. B. R. A. generally is a good retirement system from the employee's point 
of view, such may not be the case from the employer's standpoint, or for all employees. 
Careful consideration should be given to the costs of the P. E. R. A. program and the 
relative portions borne by employer and employee. Bvaluation should be made of the 
career service aspects of P. E. R. A. and to the way it meets or fails to meet the needs of 
certain categories of employees. (It is extremely difficult to present a simplified picture 
of the costs and other factors pertaining to a retirement system. The general statements 
made below are covered in detail in the body of the report.) 
Costs and Contributions 
P. B. R.,A. is a joint-contributory retirement plan, operating on an actuarial reserve 
basis. Contributions are made by both employer and employee as service ls rendered. 
Contribution rates are often mistakenly equated with the actual cost of a retirement plan. 
The employee may assume that because both he and the employer contribute at the same 
rate, he ls paying 50 per cent of the cost of his retirement annuity. The employer may 
also think that he is contributing 50 per cent of the cost of retirement or that his contri-
butions are covering his entire costs, whatever proportion of the total this cost might be. 
Actually, an employee's contributions to P. B. R. A. are more likely to constitute 
20 ~o 30 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity. An employee who has a final 
average salary of $4, 800, with 20 years of service at age 65, contributes approximately 
27 per cent of the value of his final annuity. This proportion includes the interest earned 
oil his contributions. An employee with the same final average salary who retires at age 60 
with 20 years' service contributes approximately 22 per cent of the value of his retirement 
annuity. If an employee with the same final average salary retires at age 55 with 30 years' 
service, he contributes approximately 31 per cent of his final annuity. These proportions 
are based on the ass:umptions that: I) the employee receives gradual salary increases 
throughout the period of employment; and 2) the employee contributes at the same rate 
throughout the period of employment. 
If employees have large salary increases during the last ten years of service, and/or 
contribute at a lesser rate during the period of significantly lower salary, the proportion 
vi 
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contributed of final annuities is less. These conditions reduce the proportion of the 
retirement $nnuity financed by employees, because these annuities are based on final 
average salaries resulting from the large salary increases and/or ·because the retirement 
annuities are· based on the larger contribution rate, regardless of the number of years 
coiltributlons may have been made into the retirement fund at a lesser rate. 
Changes in the contribution rate and the sizable increase in• salaries since World 
War JI have had an effect on the proportion of retirement annuities financed through 
contributions to P. B. R. A ~ by state, school, and municipal employees - - some of whom 
have already retired. As of the end of the 1958 fiscal year, 88. 6 per cent of the liabilities 
for retired or deceased state employees were employer financed. This proportion was 
slightly less for the school and municipal divisions . Prior to World War JI, employees 
. cpntributed at a 3. 5 per cent rate. That rate was increased to five per cent in 1949 and to 
six per cent as of July I, 1958. 
Another significant factor in the small proportion of state employee contributions was 
~e prior service credit without back payment granted to those state employees with a con-
siderable number of years of service before the retirement system was established in 1931. 
Prior service credits were not granted members of the school and municipal divisions. 
Even though the employer is paying the major portion of ·retirement benefits, the 
state has contributed fewer dollars to P. E. R. A. since its inception than have state employees. 
State employees have contributed $18. 5 million and the state as employer slightly' in excess 
of $17 million. During the first five years of the plan, the state made no contributions at 
all. Between 1936 and 1946, the state's annual contributions varied from token payments to 
a sum almost equal to that contributed by employees. Since 1946, the state's share has been 
approximately equal to employees' contributions. In both the school and municipal divisions, 
the employer rate of contribution has been approximately the same as the employees'. 
Financing P. E. R. A. Benefits 
At the present time there are unfunded accrued liabilities of $35 million in the state 
division of P.E.R.A., almost $15 million in the school division, and slightly more than· 
$.5 million in the municipal fund. These liabilities are computed by the system's actuary 
and are based on the difference between assets on hand and the liabilities resulting from 
benefits already earned by present members, both active and retired. These liabilities 
do not apply to future credits to be earned by present and new employees, as it is assumed 
that these will be met by future employer-employee contributions and the investment of 
these contributions • 
In the state division the unfunded accrued liability exists because of: 1) the failure 
of the state to contribute in the past for prior service credits; 2) the failure of the state 
in the past to contribute at a rate which would meet its share of current financing; 3) the 
relatively recent salary increases which have raised the level of retirement annuities, 
which are based on final average salary; 4) the increased life expectancies of P. E. R.A. 
annuitants; and 5) the increase in the maximum annuity from $200 per month to $300 per 
month for those members retiring prior to age 65. Of these five the most impartant are 
1) and 3). 
vii 
This unfunded accrued liability, in a sense, is similar to the national debt, in that 
it becomes payable over a period of years, rather than all at once. As long as the retire-
ment system continues, current income can be used to fund these liabilities as they become 
due. Future unfunded accrued liabilities resulting from the use of current income to cover 
past unfunded accrued liabilities, in turn, may also be financed in the same way. 
To keep this liability from continuing to grow, it is necessary to meet the interest on 
this amount. The liability represents a deficit in assets which cannot be invested. If the 
employer contributes at a rate high enough to cover the interest Jnst because of the lack of 
these funds to invest, the unfunded liability will not increase, unless there is a continued 
sizable increase in salaries. 
Except for prior service credits, the unfunded accrued liability has grown in the 
school and municipal divisions for the same reasons as the state division. 
At present the state, school, and municipal employers are contributing at a rate of 
ape per cent. According to the calculations made by the system's actuary, the state should 
be contributing at a rate of 6. 7 per cent and the schools at a rate of 6.52 per cent to 
finance completely the interest on the unfunded liabilities. The current six per cent rate 
is sufficient not only to pay the interest but to amortize the unfunded liability in the 
municipal division in 15 years. Should a decision be made to amortize the unfunded 
liabilities in the state and school divisions, over a 35-year period, the state would have to 
contribute at a rate of 7. 98 per cent and the schools, 6. 99 per cent. If there were no 
further increases in the unfunded liability, the state's contribution rate in 1994 would fall 
to 4. 94 per cent and the schools' to 5. 87 per cent - the 1994 date corresponding to the end 
of the amortization period. 
Coverage Problems Under P. E. R. A. 
All full-time employees of the state and of those political subdivisions participating 
in the P. B. R. A program, with few exceptions, are required to be members of P. E. R. A. 
For a variety of reasons, some of these employees are not covered, and there is no legal 
requirement that coverage be provided for temporary and/or part-time emplnyees. The 
P. E. R. A. retirement board has appeared reluctant to make an issue of requiring eligible 
employees to participate in the retirement program, even though it has the authority to do 
so; however, there are no penalties provided by law which may be imposed upon agencies 
or employees for not joining. 
In addition to those employees of various state agencies and political subdivisions who 
should be covered, but are not, there are approximately 5,000 state employees who are 
actually temporary, part-time, or exempt from P.B.R.A. coverage. These employees are 
provided with no retirement coverage at all while in the employ of the state. The school and 
municipal divisions also have some temporary and part-time employees without retirement 
coverage, although the problem is not as extensive as in the state division. 
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The officials and employees of three member cities of the municipal division have 
indicated a desire to withdraw from P. B. R. A. and to substitute O. A. S. D. I. coverage 
:Instead. These cities, Arvada, Fort Morgan, and Gunnison, feel that they do not have 
care er services, so that employees do not stay in service long enough to retire, and 
their employees object to six per cent deductions from their salaries. 
Older Employees and P. E. R. A. 
Another problem of sqme importance is that of older employees who reach age 65 or 
more without sufficient years of service to provide them with more than a small retirement 
benefit under P. B. R. A. This is especially a problem in the school division, where, as of 
June 30, 1958, a total of 530 employees over the age of 59 had four years of service or less. 
This group comprises one-third of the school division membership in this age category. 
Almost 20 per cent of all state members over 59 years of age fall in this group, as do 25 
per cent of the municipal division membership. 
Most of these employees have entered public service after their 55th birthdays, and 
it can be argued that the employer has no obligation to provide retirement benefits beyond 
those which accrue from the short period of public service. It should be remembered,. 
however, that many of these employees have had 0. A. S. D. I. coverage prior to entering 
P. B. R. A. -covered employment. During the years in which they work in P. B. R. A. -
covered employment, no contributions are made to O. A. S. D. I., consequently their salary 
credits under O.A.S.D.I. are reduced. As a result, these employees receive a small 
retirement benefit from each source, the total of which may be less than that provided by 
the Colorado Old Age Pension . 
Many of these employees are in the low salary brackets and hired at an advanced age 
to perform custodial work or other unskilled services. If such employees have only small 
benefits from both O. A. S. D. I. and P. E. R. A. and no other income, the only alternatives 
are to go on working or to go on the old age pension. 
Because of the questionable efficiency of these older employees as they approach 70, 
it is possible that the state and other public employers may consider mandatory retirement 
as a means of removing older, less efficient workers from public service. In taking such 
a step, retirement provisions for these older workers should be carefully examined to see 
if improvements can be made which .would be neither too costly, nor unfair to the long-
term career service employee. 
P. B. R. A. as a Career Service Retirement Plan 
The normal working career is usually considered as 30 years or more, yet the 
maximum P. B. R. A. retirement benefits are based on 20 years' service at age 65. 
Bmployees who work more years for the state are penalized, because they continue to pay 
into P. E. R. A. without receiving any increase in benefits. The present plan also encourages 
employees to retire from P. E. R.A. -covered employment at an early enough age to acquire 
O. A. S. D. I. benefits or retirement benefits in another plan through subsequent employment. 
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P. B. R. A. is especially advantageous to the employee who enters covered.public. 
service at age 40 or later, since he will receive the same retirement benefit as 
the employee who enters covered public service at age 25 or 30. For these 
reasons, P. B. R. A. should be re-examined in light of public employment personnel 
practices, to see whether modifications may be needed in keeping with the concepts 
of career service. 
O. A. S. D. I. Coverage for Public BmploY.:ees 
Amendments to the Social Security Act since 1950 have extended eligibility 
for O. A. S. D. I. coverage to public employees. Between 1950 and 1954 such cover-
age was available only for public employees who were not already members, or 
eligible to be members, of a public employees' retirement program. Under these 
provisions, Colorado passed legislation to make O. A. s. D. I. coverage available 
to employees of political subdivisions who were not already covered by a public 
employee retirement program. 
Further changes in the Social Security Act in 1954 and 1956 extended 
coverage to those public employees covered by a -retirement system, but only upon 
a favorable referendum of such employees. Under these amendments it is possible 
to divide a public employees' retirement system into several groups for referenda 
purposes. In Colorado these groups would include state employees, each institu• 
tlon. of higher education, school districts (either as a group or by district), and 
municipalities (either as a group or by city). Police and firemen (and by implica-
tion, the state patrol) would be excluded from such referenda unless express 
permission is given the state for their inclusion through further amendment to the 
Social Security Act. 
The 1956 amendments made it possible for specifically designated states 
to set up two-part retirement systems. One part would include those employees 
who desired to remain under the old plan, and the other . those employees who · 
wished to have their retirement system combined with O. A. s. D. I. 'Ibe same sub-
groups could be established for referenda purposes, as is the case in the states · 
without a two-part retirement system. States have been added to the two-part 
list upon their own initiative. State legislative and/or executive request has been 
sufficient to amend the Social Security Act to add states to the list. 
P»esent O. A. S. D. I. Benefits and Contribution Rates 
Retirement benefits under 0. A. S. D. I. currently range between a minimum 
of $33 and a maximmn of $127, depending upon average monthly wage. An additional 
benefit is payable to a retlrant•s wife. This spouse's benefit may be.equal to one-
half the hueband's primary insurance benefit. 
-
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Survivorship benefits for the wife and family of a ~Uy insured individual 
are payable up to a maximum of $254 per month, depending on the number of 
children under age 18 and the averag"e salary of the person insured. Dlsability 
benefits are also payable in an amount equal to the primary insurance benefit for 
disabled fully insured individuals who have attained their 50th birthdays and who 
have submitted proper proof. of such disability. 
Contribution rates for 0. A. S. D. I. are currently 2. 5 per cent of the 
first $4,800 of annual.salary for both employer and employee. These rates are 
scheduled to increase to three per cent in 1960, 3.5 per cent in 1963, four per 
cent in 1966, and 4.5 per cent in 1969. ' 
Back-Dating of O. A. S. D. I. Coverage 
For the purposes of computing O. A. S. D. I. retirement benefits a covered 
employee's salary is averaged from January 1, 1951, until the time of his retire-
ment. This average includes only that portion of annual salary upon which 
O. A. S. D. I. contributions are made. Therefore, an employee is credited with a 
maximum of $4, 800 in any one year and with no salary in years in which the 
employee made no contributions to 0. A. S. D. I.; however, the five lowest years 
may he dropped out in making these computations. 
It was recognized that many public employees covered by a retirement 
system probably would not have O. A. S. D. I. coverage from January 1, 1951, until 
the date when the system was combined with O. A. S. D. I. Since the five lowest 
years may be dropped out in computing O. A. S. D. I. benefits, provision has been 
made to back-date O. A. S. D. I. coverage to January I, 11956, for public employees 
who chose to combine the systems. 
To include back-dating, the agreement providing for O. A. S. D. I. coverage 
must be dated no later than December 31, 1959. In' other words, unless such an 
agreement is signed within the specified time, maximum O. A. S. D. I. benefits 
commensurate with salary cannot be provided. While this time period was extended 
in 1957, Congress may show reluctance to extend' it any further. 
Methods of Combining O. A. S. D. I. with a Public Employees' Retirement System 
There are three basic ways in which 0. A. S. D. I. may be merged with a 
public employees' retirement system. 
Supplementation - 0. A. S. D. I. benefits are added to the present retire-
ment system; the present benefits are maintained in full measure without change. 
The benefits and contribution rates of the present system are continued at the 
existing level, with O. A. S. D. I. benefits and conbillatlioBs added. 
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Offset- The retirement plan is fused with 0. A. S. D. I. so that present 
retirement benefits would be directly offset by social security benefits. A complete 
merging of benefits and contributions is generally achieved. Consequently, as 
O. A. S. D. I. benefits and contribution rates increase, the retirement plan benefits 
and contribution rates decrease in the same proportion. 
Coordination - O. A. S. D. I. is combined with an adjusted retirement plan. 
The present retirement plan would be revised downward with respect to benefits 
and contributions, although not necessarily in the same amount as O. A. S. D. I. 
benefits and contribution rates. For the present, contribution rates would be 
slightly higher than the system before combination. As 0. A. S. D. I. rates increase, 
contribution rates would increase because there would be no downward revision in 
the present system either in rates or benefits. 
Specific Proposals to Combine P. E. R. A. and 0. A. S. D. I. 
Several proposals for combining P. E. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I. were actuar-
ially evaluated. These proposals included: I) full supplementation, the most 
expensive method of combination; 2) full offset, the least expensive method of 
combination; 3) a coordinated plan in which P. E. R. A. benefits are reduced at 
age 65; with the effect that the total benefit is slightly higher than under P.E.R.A. 
alone; and 4) a new retirement plan based on 30 years of service and coordinated 
with 0. A. S. D. I. 
In presenting these proposals for evaluation it was specified that no present 
employee should receive less under a combination plan than he would receive under 
P. E. R. A. 
Under the full supplementation plan, present P. E. R. A. benefits and con-
tribution rates would be maj.ntained, and O. A. S. D. I. benefits and contributions 
would be added. An employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive the same 
benefit he would have received under P. E. R.A. Upon reaching age 65, O.A.S.D.I. 
benefits would be added. 
The offset plan is generally similar to P. E. R. A. with three exceptions: 
I) O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits would replace P.E.R.A. survivorship 
benefits if higher; 2) O. A. S. D. I. disability benefits would be added to P. E. R. A. 
disability benefits; and 3) benefits would be the same as P. E. R. A. for retirement 
before age 65. At age 65, P. E. R. A. benefits would be reduced by the amount of 
the O. A. S. D. I. primary insurance benefit. Eligibility for the O. A. S. D. I. spouse's 




The coordinated plan is also similar to P. E. R. A. except that O. A. S. D. I. 
survivorship benefits would be substituted for P. E. R. A. survivorship benefits. 
Disability benefits would be provided by both plans. Retirement benefits prior to 
age 65 would be computed in the same way as P. E. R. A. at present. At age 65, 
P. B. R. A. benefits would be computed according to the following formula : one per 
cent of the first $4, 800 of final average salary times the number of years of 
service not to exceed 20 plus 2. 5 per cent of the amount of final average salary 
above $4, 800 times the years of service not to exceed 20 plus the 0. A. S. D. I. 
primary insurance benefit. The 0. A. S. D. I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would 
be additional. 
The new retirement plan is based on a career concept of 30 years' service 
and retirement at age 65. The benefit formula was devised to blend in with the 
O. A. S. D. I. primary benefit. Retirement benefits are computed according to the 
following formula at age 65: . 67 per cent of the first $4,800 of final average 
salary times years of service, with no limit plus I. 67 per cent of final average 
salary above $4,800 times years of service, with no limit plus O. A. S. D. I. primary 
benefit. The 0. A. S. D. I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional. Retire• 
ment before age 65 is possible, but would be discouraged through the provision that 
the annuity paid for early retirement would be the actuarial equivalent of the same 
annuity at age 65. For example, an employee retiring at age 60 would receive a 
monthly benefit of approximately two-thirds of what he would have received for the 
same amount of service at age 65. 
Other benefits of the new retirement plan would be similar to P. B. R. A, 
except that O. A. S. D. I. survivorship benefits would be substituted for similar 
benefits under P. E. R. A. 
The evaluations for the offset anp coordinated plans were made in two ways. 
First, it was assumed that credits already earned for service under P.B.R.A. 
would be converted to the combined plan formula. Second, it was · assumed that 
credits already earned for service under P.B.R.A. would be frozen--that ia, full 
credit would be given under the P. E. R. A. formula, with the new formula to apply 
only to service under the new plan. (The offset and coordinated plans with earned 
credits frozen are naturally more expensive than the offset and coordinated plan■ 
with no "frozen" e.arned credits.) 
Contribution Rates, Costs, and Benefits 
The contribution rates and costs for all of the combined plans will be 
higher than current P. E. R. A. rates, eventually, if not at present. The scheduled 
rate increases for O. A. S. D. I. will increase the contribution rates over existing 
rates for all plans, including offset. Employee contribution rates and benefits under 
each plan are the same for the state, school, and municipal divisions. Employer 
contribution rates for each plan vary somewhat from division to division. 
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Employee contribution rates on the first $4,800 of salary for the various 
combination plans would vary in 1959 from five per cent (coordination) to 8. 5 per 
cent (full supplementation). The employee contribution rate on the first $4,800 
of salary for the new retirement plan and the offset plan in 1959 wruld be six per 
cent, the same as P. E. R. A. Under all combination plans, employees would con-
tribute at a rate of six per cent on the portion of annual salary above $4,800. 
The employee contribution rate on the first $4,800 of salary would increase as 
O. A. S. D. I. contribution rates increase, for all combination plans except offset. 
By 1969, these rates would be seven per cent for the coordinated plan, 7 .5 per cent 
for the new retirement plan, and 10. 5 per cent for full supplementation. These 
employee contribution rates would be the same for members of all P. E. R. A. 
divisions. 
Employer contribution rates would vary from division to division. In 1959, 
the state would contribute at the following rates: full supplementation, 9 .11 per 
cent; coordination, 6. 3 per cent or 6. 9 per cent ( depending on whether ea med 
credits are frozen); new retirement plan, 5. 62 per cent; and offset, 5 .15 per cent 
or 6. 03 per cent (depending on whether earned credits are frozen). These rates 
include the amount needed to meet the interest on the unfunded liability and are 
comparable to the 6. 7 per cent rate needed for P. E. R. A. to meet the interest on 
the unfunded liability. 
The employer's contribution rates would also increase as O. A. S. D. I. 
contribution rates increased. In 1969, the state would contribute at the following 
rates: full supplementation, 10. 9 per cent; coordination, 8. 09 per cent or 8. 69 
per cent (depending on whether earned credits are frozen); new retirement plan, 
7 .41 per cent; and offset, 7.34 per cent or 8.22 per cent (depending on whether 
earned credits are frozen). These rates are also based on meeting the interest on 
the unfunded liability, and are comparable to the 6. 7 per cent employer contribution 
rate for P.E.R.A. The employer rates for the school and municipal divisions are 
shown in Chapter III of the repart. Also shown in Chapter III are the employer 
contribution rates if the unfunded liability were amortized over a 35-year period. 
For employees with 20 years' service at age 65, annuity benefits under 
the offset plan would be the same as those under P. E. R. A. , except that the 
O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be added. Under full supplementa-
tion, all O.A.S.D,I. retirement benefits would be added to P.E.R.A. benefits. 
The coordinated plan would provide annuity benefits slightly in excess of P. E. R. A.' s 
at present, and the spause's benefit, if payable, would be added. Under the new 
retirement plan employees at age 65 with 20 years' service would receive lower 
benefits than under P. E • R • A. However, after 25 years' service in the low salary 
brackets and 30 years' service in all other salary brackets, except the highest, 
benefits under the new retirement plan would be approximately the same or slightly 
higher than under P. E. R. A. Additional credits would be given for service in excess 




For less than 20 years' service at age 65, the annuity benefits would be 
proportional to those shown above. Bmployees who retired prior to age 65 under 
all combination plans, except the new retirement plan, would receive the annuity 
similar to the one now provided under P. B. R. A. Under the new retirement plan, 
an employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive a reduced annuity based on 
the amount he v.uuld have received had he retired at age 65 with the same amount 
of service. (Chapter III presents a detailed discussion, with appropriate tables, 
of the retirement annuity benefits under the several combination plans at different 
salary levels and varying periods of service. ) 
P. B. R. A. and Combination Pl.ans~ Some Considerations 
No clear-cut case can be made for combining or not combining P. B. R .. A. 
and O. A. S. D. I. There are general advantages which should be considered, as 
well as good points and drawbacks to each of the proposed combination plans. 
Combination may or may not be desirable for a specific employee, depending on 
his age, years of service, marital status, salary, sex, and career aspirations. 
In general. a combined plan will not be looked upon too favorably by 
employees who plan to retire before age 65, especially those who plan to work 
elsewhere in O. A • s. D. I. covered employment. Employees in the higher salary 
brackets and women whose husbands are working in O. A. S. D. I. -covered employ-
ment also may see little desirability in a combination plan. 
Combination with O. A. S. D. I. would be most advantageous to older 
employees nearing age 65, mjirried male employees who expect to qualify for the 
spouse's benefit, older employees who begin their state or local government 
service after a number of years of 0. A. S. D. I. coverage, younger workers who 
are still more or less transient, and employees in the lower salary brackets. 
Originally, survivorship benefits and continuity of retirement coverage 
for non-career employees were among the reasons that combination of O. A. S. D. I. 
and .P. E. R. A. was advocated. The addition of survivorship benefits to P. E. R. A. 
has given O. A. S. D. I. little advantage in this respect. The addition of deferred 
annuities to P. E. R. A. minimizes the need of retirement coverage for transient 
employees, although the value of deferred annuities is questionable for younger 
employees with families, who may not be able to afford deferring a return on 
their contributions until age 65. Combination with O. A. S. D. I. is also looked upon 
favorably because of the spouse's benefit. 
O.A.S.D.I. is designed to provide minimum retirement standards. Other 
retirement systems usually are designed to attract career employees whose final 
average salaries are considered a measure of their worth and upon which retire-
ment benefits are usually based. It is argued that a combination of the two 
provides both minimum and maximum retirement limits. Some proponents argue 
that all employees probably will be covered by O. A. S. D. I. eventually, so that 
Colorado should take this step for its public employees now at the most advantageous 
; time, while coverage may be back-dated to January I, 1956, thus insuring present 
employees no loss in 0. A. S. D. I. benefits. 
xv 
On the other hand, it is pointed out that all combination plans are more 
costly than P. E. R. A. Some of the present P. E. R. A. provisions are either 
incompatible with O. A. S. D. I. or duplicate benefits. Retirement before 65 and· 
ti~ferred annuities do not blend in too well with 0. A:S. D. I. The P. E. R. A. 
efstem also provides survivorship benefits similar to those of 0. A. S. D. I., as 
w~ll as superior disability benefits. 
The advantages and disadvantages of P. E. R. A. have already been discussed. 
Furl •upplementation provides liberal benefits and is not incompatible with the 
pres~t P. E. R. A. program. The basic objection to full supplementation is its cost 
and h~ll contribution rate by both employer and employee. 
Offset is the least expensive of the combination plans and provides the 
avera~ etnployee with the same benefits he would receive under P. E. R. A., plus 
the spaqae's benefit, if payable. The main objections to offset are: 1) P. E. R. A. 
would be closely integrated with 0. A. S. D. I. to the extent that changes in 0. A.S. D. I. 
would cause changes in P. E. R. A.; 2) upward revisions in O. A. S, D. I. benefits 
would not reflect in increased employee benefits, because P. E. R. A. benefits 
would be tletluced proportionately; and 3) except for older workers and continuous 
minimum boverage for transient workers, none of the existing retirement problems 
are corrected. 
The coordinated plan retains all of P. E. R. A. 's features, which may or 
may not be ~esirable. The benefits are slightly in excess of P. E. R. A. 's, but also 
cost more. Adoption of this plan would not provide solutions to all of the present 
problems under P. E. R. A. 
The new retirement plan, based on 30 years' service at age 65, places a 
greater propartion of the total cost on the employee (approximately 45 per cent) 
and discourages early retirement. Transient employees and older employees 
would benefit froJn O. A • S. D. I. coverage. 
The 11:ew retirement plan gives the employer the oppartunity to correct 
any existing dissatisfactions with P. E. R. A. Present employees would not have a 
voice indetermining whether the plan should be set up, because the system can 
be established for all future employees; however, present employees could 
transfer, if they ~o desired. Career service is recognized through the 30-year 
base and the granting of additional credit for years of service over 30, with no 
limit. The new retirement plan costs would be in excess of P. E, R. A. costs, 
but less than those under any other combined plan except offset. 
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Recommendations 
The Legislative Council Committee on Public Employees' Retirement has 
reviewed the existing retirement system and the specific plans for combining 
P'. B, R. A. and O. A. S. D. I, The committee recommends against consideration by 
the General Assembly of f~ll supplementation, off set, and coordination as methods 
of combining P. B. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I. Full supplementation is not favored 
because of the extremely high cost to both employer and employee. Offset is 
opposed because the degree of integration required with 0. A. S. D. I. would make 
P. B. R. A. dependent upon policy changes made in Washington; the cost and benefits 
of the P. B. R. A. portion of an offset plan \\0 uld be reduced each time a change was 
made in social security. The coordinated plan overcomes some of the objections 
to both full supplementation and offset; however, the committee does not believe 
tnat the shortcomings of the existing retirement system could be corrected by this 
type of combination. 
A referendum of employees would be necessary in the event that any of 
these plans were considered desirable. There has been no inclination on the part 
of the P. E. R. A. legislative committee to support a combination plan. In fact, 
this group has opposed combination in the past and is continuing to voice opposition. 
The failure of the P. E. R. A. legislative committee to support combination 
makes it dubious that a referendum would be successful. It would be possible, 
however, under any of these proposals to have Colorado designated as a state with 
a two-part retirement system. If this were done, those employees who wanted 
combination could get it y.rithout affecting those who want to retain P. B. R. A. as it 
is. Yet, the committee cannot recommend any of the above mentioned combina-
tion plans, even if a two-part retirement system were established. 
The elimination of these combination plans leaves two alternatives for the 
General Assembly if it is deemed desirable to improve the retirement program for 
public employees. Either P. E. R. A. can be changed, or a new retirement plan may 
be established, which would combine a modified P. E. R. A. plan with O. A. S. D. I. 
The resolution directing this study called for a continued study of the 
problem of retirement for Colorado public employees. Consequently, your 
committee has reviewed the two alternative methods for improving the retirement 
program in light of the problems that are present in the existing retirement 
pr9gram. 
hnproving P. B • R. A. 
I) Financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present accrued 
unfunded liabilities could be handled under the existing retirement program. Solving 
this problem would require an increase in either the employee's or: the employer's 
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contribution rate, or both, to at least pay the interest on the unfunded liability aµd 
perhaps that rate should be increased sufficiently to amortize the unfunded liability 
over a 35-year period. 
2) The fact that the employer is currently paying 70 to 75 per cent of 
each retirement annuity cannot be changed as long as 20 years is used as a service 
career base and as long as equal six per cent contribution rates are maintained. 
Your committee is not saying that the employer's financing of 70 to 75 per cent of 
each annuity is either good or bad. 
3) The problem attached to the lack of retirement coverage for temparary, 
part-time, and some full-time employees can be solved without combining with 
O. A. S. D. I. Those employees falling in the above categories could be covered by 
0. A. s. D. I. alone, if they are not eligible for P. E. R. A. A tightening of the 
eligibility requirements in P. E. R. A., with penalties for failure to comply, could 
solve the lack of coverage for some full-time employees. 
4) The three member cities whose officials and employees want to with-
draw from P. B. R. A. presents some problems. .These problems cannot be solved 
to the satisfaction of the cities under the existing P. E. R. A. program. These cities 
would have to be deemed separate retirement systems for purposes of combining 
with 0. A. S. D. I. and then later given the opportunity to drop P. E. R. A. coverage. 
If this procedure is followed there may be questions raised by the employees 
regarding impairment of benefits already earned under P. E. R. A. 
5) The fact that some employees enter service at an advanced age and 
consequently cannot secure sufficient coverage for a full annuity is a problem that 
cannot be solved and perhaps shouldn't be solved under P. E. R. A. Employment 
policies perhaps should be reviewed in light of this problem, both as to the hiring 
and retention of older employees. 
6) The fact that P. E. R. A. retirement benefits are based on a career 
concept of 20 years can be changed by legislative action for all future employees. 
Combine 0. A. S. D. I. and P. E. R. A. in a New System 
1) Combining P. E. R. A. with 0. A. S. D. I. will not obviate the necessity 
for increasing the employer's contribution rate to pay the interest on the unfunded 
liability and/or to amortize that unfunded liability. 
2) A combination of the two retirement programs based on a 30 year 
concept would result in the employer paying approximately 55 to 60 per cent of each 
annuity as opposed to the 70 to 75 per cent relationship that now exists. 
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3J There would be no particular advantage of a combination plan to take 
care of those employees (part-time, temporary and some full-time) who are not 
now covered by P. E. R.A., except for those part-time or temporary employees who 
later become full-time permanent employees. In these cases a combination plon 
would _provide continuity in coverage. 111ese employees could be covered by 
O. A. S. D. I. alone under the present system or under a combination plan. 
4) The only way that the three member cities of P. E. R. A. can get out of 
P. E. R. A. and under 0. A. S. D. I. is through a combination plan. First the employees 
of these cities must come under a combination plan and then later vote to discontinue 
the P. E. R. A. portion of the retirement program. 
5) For those current employees who enter P. E. R. A. -covered service at 
an advanced age, a combination plan would be of considerable advantage. 
6) The combination plan offers a new career concept of 30 years' service 
with recognition of additional years beyond 30 as opposed to the existing 20-ycar 
base for maximum benefits. 
Your committee makes the following recommendations: 
I) establish the new retirement system combining O. A. S. D. I. with 
P. E. R. A. with a 30-year career base as detailed in this report; 
2) cover all part-time and temporary employees with social security alone; 
3) deem the following as separate retirement systems: a) State Division; 
b) Highway Patro];l c) Judges' Division; d) School Division; e) the cities of 
Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Arvada, Gunnison, Fort Morgan, Wray, Alamosa, and 
Boulder; and f) each institution of higher education; 
4) memorialize Congress to add Colorado to the list of states authorized 
to have a split retirement system; 
5) establish the combination plan for all new employees and then permit 
all current employees to choose individually the plan to which they want to belong; 
6) back-date social security coverage to January 1, 1956 for those 
current employees who choose to transfer to the new system and finance both the 
employee and employer back-date payments from the employees' contributions, 
which would follow them to the new system, and credit the employees' accounts for 
the amount paid on behalf of the employer; and 
I. The Highway Patrol must be excluded from the referendum under the provisions 
of Section 218 of the Social Security Act. This would allow the patrol to retain 
its present retirement program. 
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7) legislation should be passed by the General Assembly to permit the 
employees of the cities of Arvada, Gunnison, and Fort Morgan and other member 
cities so desiring to drop P. E. R. A. coverage, by employee referenda, after the 
combination plan has been adopted in those cities • 
. 
Alternative Propqsals 
1f the General As~embly decides against establishing a new retirement 
system, as suggested ·1:above, your committee recommends that the following steps 
be taken to improve the existing retirement program: 
I) the employers' and/or the employees' contribution to P. E. R. A. should 
be increased to at least pay the interest on the unfunded accrued liability; 
2) social security coverage should be provided for all part-time and 
temporary. employees not now covered by P. B. R. A. or eligible to be cowered by 
P. B. R. A.; 
3) Congress should be memoralized to add Colorado to the list of states 
permitted to have split retirement systems in order that Arvada, Gunnison, and 
Fort Mprgan could obtain O. A. S. D. I. coverage eventually; and 
4) legislation should be passed by the General Assembly to permit the 
employe~s of the cities of Arvada, Gunnison, and Fort Morgan and any other 
member cities to drop P. E. R. A. coverage, by employee referenda, after the . ~ 




PUBLIC EMPLOn,'ES' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION 
Retirement coverage for maey public employees in Colorado is provided through 
the Public Employees' Retirement Association~ Several categories of public employees 
are included under this statutory retire~nt program,1 which is divided into the 
following divisions: state employees, school district employees, municipal employees, 
and judges. As of June 30, 1958, the state division had 11,288 members; the school 
division 14,489; the municipal division, 1,129; and the judge's division, 77. 
The Colorado State Employees' Retirement Association was established by statute 
in 1931. In 1943, coverage was extended by law to include the employees of any 
school district, any city and county, and any municipality; however, each of these 
political subdivisions could refuse to avai~ itself of such coverage. At the same 
time, the State Employees' Retirement Association was renamed the Public Employees' 
Retirement Association (P.E.R.A.). Further statute changes in 1949 and 1951 added 
county and district health department employees and public housing authority employees 
to the list of those eligible for coverage under the municipal division of P.E.R.A. 
The 1951 legislation also made coverage for school employees mandatory except for 
those school districts which had set up a local retirement system. Coverage for 
the judiciary, originally provided only for supreme court judges, was extended by 
legislation in 1949, 1951, ar:rl 1952, and now includes judges of the Supreme Court, 
district courts, county courts, and juvenile courts. 
All permanent, full-time state employees are required by law to be members of 
the state division P.E.R.A., with the following exceptions: elected state officials, 
including members of the General Assembly; district and supreme court judges, who 
have a separate retirement plan; district attorneys; county commissioners; and the 
presidents, deans, professors, and instructors in state educational institutions 
which have an established retirement or annuity plan for such employees. The latter 
exception applies specificalJy to the faculty of the University of Colorado, which 
is covered for retirement purposes by the Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association. 
Elected officials may choose to be covered by P.E.R:A. even though such coverage is 
not compulsory. 
The same general coverage provisions also apply to those school districts and 
municipalities participating in the P.E.R.A. program. All school districts in the 
state except the City and County of Denver, which has its own retirement program, 
are included in P.E.R.A. 
Only eight cities, Alamosa, Arvada, Boulder, Colorado Springs, Fort Morgan, 
Gunnison, Pueblo, and Wray took advantage of the extension of P.E.R.A coverage to 
municipal employees in 1943. Only the Pueblo County Health Department has elected 
to cover its employees under P.E.R.A., and no public housing authorities have 
chosen such coverage. 
1. Chapter 111, Article 1 through 6, C.R.S. 1953 as amended by CS 1957. 
Elective officials of these political subdivisions are exempt from P .E.R.A 
membership, as are policemen and firemen, who belong to a separate retirement 
system. These elective officials as well as state elective officials may choose 
to be covered by P.E.R.A., if they so desire. 
Retirement Benefits under P.E.R.A. 
The benefits are generally similar under the three major divisions of P .E. R.A. 
(state, school, and municipal). The judges have a separate schedule of benefits 
as do members of the Colorado State Patrol. The latter group is a part of the state 
division. The provisions enumerated below apply to the three major P.E.R.A. 
divisions. 
Retirement for Age 
. Retirement is possible: 1) at any age after 35 years of service; 2) at age 
55 with 30 years of service (35 years for school employees); 3) at age 60 with 20 
years of service; 4) at age 65 with at least five years of service. The maximum 
annuity for those retiring prior to age 65 is $300 per ~onth, or 50 per cent of the 
average annual salary for the highest five consecutive years in the last 10 years 
of service, whichever is less. 
Employees who retire at age 65 or later with 20 years of service or more 
receive 50 per cent of the average annual salary for the highest five consecutive 
years in the last 10 years of service with no maximum limit. Those who retire 
at age 65 or later with less than 20 years of service receive an annuity 
proportionate to the years of service prior to retirement. For example, an employee 
who retires at age 65 or later with 10 years service would receive one-half as 
much as one who retires at the same age with 20 years service, or 25 per cent 
of the avera~e annual salary for the highest five consecutive years in his ten 
years of service. No employee may receive an annuity at or after age 65, unless 
he has at least five years of service at the tit!M3 of retirement. 
An employee who works longer than 20 years and retires at age 65 or later 
receives the same monthly annuity he would have received had he retired at age 
65 with 20 years service. In other words, except for allowing an earlier retirement 
age (at any age with 35 years' service or at age 55 - 30 years service), years 
of service in excess of 20 years do not qualify the employee for greater retirement 
benefits. Even though benefits do not increase, employees continue to pay their 
contributions into the retirement program for as long as they work in P.E.R.A. -
covered employment. 
Retirement for Disability 
An employee with five years of service for which contributions have been 
made to P.E.R.A. is entitled to a full retirement annuity if he becomes permanently 
disable<l on the job. An employee with 15 years of service -- five years as a 
contributing P.E.R.A. member -- is entitled to a full retirement annuity if he 
has a non-employment permanent disability. 
Survivorship Benefits 
Survivorship benefits were added to the P.E.R.A. program as a result of 






If a deceased member having five or more years of covered service leaves a widow 
and one or more children under 18, the widow shall receive $200 per month until the 
youngest child reaches age 18.2 This amount applies regardless of the salary 
of the deceased or the number of children. Upon remarriage or death of the widow 
prior to the youngest child's reaching age 18, the widow's allowances of $200 
ceases, but the children are then entitled to $75 per month per child, not to 
exceed a total of $200 per month to be distributed equally · among three or more 
children. This benefit also applies if there is no widow, but only surviving 
children of a deceased member having five or more years of covered service. 
If a member upon death has no children under 18 years, but leaves a widow, 
she receives an ftnnuity of approximately 25 per cent of the member's final 
average salary, in most cases. This annuity commences trhen the widow attains age 
62 and is payable for life or until remarriage. 
The widow of a deceased member having 15 or more years credited service 
receives a benefit of approximately 25 per cent of the member's final average 
salary, starti'ng at age 50 and payable for life or 1mtil remarriar.;e. ffhen no 
children or widow survive but dependent parents are living, a benefit of $75 per 
month for each parent may be paid. 
Dea th Benefits 
In the event an employee covered under P.E.R.A. dies prior to eligibility for 
retirement and survivorship benefits are not payable, a lump sum refund is made 
to his named beneficiary, or in the event that he is eligible for retire~nt the 
plan provides for a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity, to the beneficiary 
who will receive monthly payments. 
Deferred Annuity 
The deferred annuity was another benefit added by legislative action in 1957. 
Members leaving P.E.R.A. -- covered service after five or more years are entitled 
to leave their retirement deposits in the system until age 66. At that time, they 
will be eligible to receive a deferred annuity based on 2 .5 per cent of final 
average salary multiplied by the number of years of covered service, not to exceed 20. 
Colorado State Patrol 
Members of the Colorado State Patrol, in general, receive the same retirement 
benefits as other members of P.E.R.A., with two notable exceptions: 1) Members 
of the highway patrol may retire at age 55 with 20 years' service or at any age 
with 30 years of service; 2) Members of the highway patrol are immediately eligible 
for benefits ·for disabilities incurred in the performance of official duties. 
Retirement at age 55 is at one-half pay based on the same formula as for other 
P.E.R.A. members, except for the maximum limitation imposed. Annuity payments to 
highway patrolmen with early retirement shall not exceed 60 per cent of the maximum 
salary for the rank of state patrolmen durinp, the same period. 
2. Members may elect to participate in an optional group insurance program at 
nominal monthly cost to provide survivorship benefits prior to becoming 
eligible for these benefits under P.E.R.A. 
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Members of the state patrol pay an additional one per cent payroll contribution 
because of these more liberal benefits. 
Judges of Courts of Record 
Supreme court, district oourt, county court, and juvenile court judges who have 
served for an aggregate period of 10 years-~ not ~cessarily consecutive -- and 
who have reached the age of 65 years are eligible for retirement annuities according 
to the following schedule: 1) at least 10 years of service, but less than 16 years, 
a monthly annuity equal to 40 per cent of the highest monthly salary received during 
any five consecutive years of service contained within the 10 years of service 
immediately preceding retirement; 2) 16 years of service or more, a monthly annuity 
equal to 50 per cent of the average of the highest monthly salary received during 
any period of five consecutive years of service contained within the 10 years of 
service immediately preceding his retirement. Judges are eligible for all other 
P.E.R.A. benefits. 
Benefit Changes Since 1931 
When P.E.R.A. was first established for state employees in 1931, retirement 
eligibility was based on 20 years service at age 65 or 35 years service at any age. 
Upon retirement, a state employee was eligible for benefits equal to 50 per cent 
of his average salary during his last five years of service or $150 per month, 
whichever was less. 
In 1935, the act was amended to provide comp~lsory retirement at age 70. 
To be eligible for retirement benefits, a state employee had to have a minimum of 
five years service. His annuity was based on the following formula: Number of years 
of service times 1/20 time 50 per cent of average annual salary for the last five 
years of service. The maximum annuity remained at $150 per month. The compulsory 
retirement provision was removed in 1939. Instead, voluntary retirement at age 70 
was made possible, if such employees had contributed to P.E.R.A. since its creation 
in 1931, and had 15 years' service or more. 
Statutory changes in 1943 also included the provision of retirement benefits 
for municipal and school employees now eligible for coverage. School employees 
could retire after 35 years of covered employment at age 55 (municipal employees 
30 years at age 55) or at age 65 after 20 years of covered employment. Upon 
retirement, the benefit would be equal to 40 per cent of final average salary 
during last five years of service, but not to exceed $100 per month. 
Retirement eligibility provisions were again changed in 1945. Legislation 
passed at that time made it possible for an employee to retire at age 65 if he had 
worked for the state 15 years or more, or at age 70 if he had worked for the state 
for five years or more and had been a member of P.E.R.A. for at least five years. 
The amount of annuity continued to be based on 1/20 times years of service times 
50 per cent of average salary during the last five years of service, with a maximum 
of $150 per month. The present retirement eligibility rules for the state patrol 
were also enacted into law in 1945. 
The current retirement eligibility provisions were enacted into law in 1947. 
These included retirement at age 55 with 30 years' service, (35 years for school 






65 with 5 years of service. The formula for computing retirement annuities remained 
the same, as did the $150 monthly maximum limit. This monthly maximum was raised 
to $200 in 1949, and in 1953 the law was again changed so that the $200 limit 
applied only to those who retired before the age of 65. For those retiring at age 
65·or later, the maximum is equal to one-half of the final average salary for the 
highest five consecutive years in the last 10 years of service. An employee with 
20 years service at age 65 1 therefore, would ·be eligible for the maximum annuity. 
In 1957 1 the $200 monthly annuity limitation for employees who retire prior to 
their 65th birthday was raised to $aoo. 
Survivorship benefits arxl deferred annuities were also added to P.E.R.A. through 
legislation passed in 1957. Disability retirement annuities were made part of the 
plan at its inception in 1931. 
Optional Annuities 
Employees who retire with P.E.R.A. benefits may choose one of four different 
annuities. Selection must be made at the time of retirement and no subsequent 
change may be made. The four annuity plans include: 1) a single life, ordinary 
annuity, payable for the life of the employee only, and terminating at his death 
without refund of aey kind to the estate of the deceased annuitant or to his or 
her beneficiary of aey difference in the amount paid into the fund by such employee 
and the amount withdrawn by him prior to his death; 2) a reduced single life, refun«t 
annuity which is the actuarial equivalent of the annuity in (1), payable only during 
the life of the employee, with a refund to his beneficiary or estate of any 1difference 
between the amount of his contributions and the amourit withdrawn prior to his 
death; 3) a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity, which is the actuarial equivalent 
of the annuity payable in (1), payable for the joint lives of the employee and his 
designated co-beneficiary without any refund to the estate of either upon their 
deaths; and 4) a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity which is the actuarial 
equivalent of the annuity payable in (1), payable to the employee and his designated 
co-beneficiary in monthly amounts which shall be decreased by one-half upon the 
death of either of them, without refund to the estate of either upon their deaths. 
Prior Service Credits 
Prior service credits for retirement are usually granted in recognition of 
service performed by older employees prior to the establishment of a retirement 
program. Such credits may also be granted to employees who did not join a 
retirement plan when it was established, but who chose to do so at a later date. 
Prior service credits were granted only to the members of the state division of 
P.E.R.A. 
Employees who had worked for the state prior to the start of P.E.R.A. in 1931, 
received credit for those years of service when they retired if they had become 
members of P.E.R.A. before retirement. Employees who met the retirement eligibili1iy-
requirements of age 65 and 20 years service or 35 years service at any age, could 
receive the maximum retirement annuity even though any or most of this service 
occured prior to the creation of P.E.R.A. but no retirements were allowed until 
1936 or after at least five years' payment and service. 'Ihese prior service credits 
wera granted without any employee contributions required. State employees were 
also eligible for certain other prior service credits up.on payment of back 
cont"ributions with interest at four per cent compounded semiannually. 
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i j The act creating the retirement system, in 1931, provided that state employees 
at that time could join the plan up to 1933, and receive credit back to August, 
1931, by paying back contributions with four per cent interest compounded semiannually. 
In 1939, a provision was added that any employee not yet 55 years of age who began 
his employment with the state prior to'July 1, 1940, could receive credit back to 
1931, upon the payment of back contributions am interest. 
Prio·r service credits were further liberalized in 1941. A retirement act 
amendment passed in that .year made it possible for state employees who were in 
state service prior to 1931 to join the retirement plan if they had not already 
done so. This provision repealed the restriction in the 1931 law which gave state 
employees at that time only until 1933 to join the plan. Through the same statutory 
amendment, these employees could receive prior service credits back to·l931, upon 
payment of back contributions and interest, but no service credit was allowed to 
such members for service rendered before 1931. Employees in state service prior 
to 1941 who had not joined the retirement system were also· provided for in this 
legislation. These employees, if they subsequently joined P.E.R.A. could also 
back-date their credits to January 1, 1941, by paying back contributions and 
interest. 
Credits for military service were also provided by legislation in 1941 and 
1945. State employees who served in the armed forces received retirement credit 
for the period of such service. No payments were necessary if the compensation 
received while a member of the armed forces was less than the salary received as 
a state employee. 
State Department of Employment personnel who were on the federal payroll during 
the time this agency was under federal control also were eligible for prior service 
credits upon back payment of contributions with interest to cover this period. 
Those who were state employees prior to this transfer and who had withdrawn their 
P.E.R.A. contributions were required to pay back these contributions with interest 
in addition to those which covered the period during which they were employed 
by the federal government. 
Employees who withdraw their accumulated contributions am leave covered 
service and then re-enter such service within five years my restore their 
retirement credits by repaying the amount withdrawn in addition to an amount 
with interest equa 1 to the contributions which would have been made had they 
remained in state service. 
Teachers' Retirement Fund 
Although prior service credits are not allowed for municipal and school 
members of P.E.R.A., the General Assembly has provided minimum benefits for 
teachers ,.,ho have retired with little or no coverag~ under P.E.R.A. These 
benefits, however, do not make up for the lack of pr:i._or service credits. The 
General Assembly established a separate teacher retirement fund in 1951 to be 
administered by the Commissioner of Education. Teachers who retire prior to July 
1, 1967, and who have had 20 years' service and are at least 65 years of age are 
eligible for a maximum monthly benefit of $100. Any an.nui ty received from P.E.R.A. 






Contributions and Costs 
P.E.R.A. is a joint-contributory retirement plan, operating on an actuarial 
reserve basis.3 Contributions are made by both employer and employee as service 
is rendered. In general, both employees and employers at present contribute six 
per cent of the employee's salary to the retirement association. State patrol 
employees and judges are the two exceptions.· Because of more costly retirement 
benefits, both the patrol employees and the state contribute at a seven per cent 
rate. The judges contribute six per cent, but the employer's contribution is 12 
per cent. 
Contribution rates are often mistakenly equated with the actual cost of a 
retirement plan. The employee may assume that because both he and the employer 
contribute at the same rate, he is paying 50 per cent of the cost of his retirement 
annuity. Actually, the employee's contributions to P.E.R.A. are more li,kely to 
constitute 25 or 30 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity. The employer 
may also think that he is contributing 50 per cent of the cost of retirement or 
that his contributions are paying the employer's entire cost, whatever proportion 
of the total this cost might be. Actually, the employer's contributions have not 
met his share for a number of reasons which will be discussed after employees' 
contributions are analyzed. 
Examples of Employee Contributions 
A state employee who is 65 and has worked for 20 years and who has a final 
averaRe salary of $4,800 (based on the high consecutive five years in the last 
10 years of employment) is eligible for a $200 per month retirement annuity 
until death. According to the mortality table used by P.E.R.A., the value of his 
retirement annuity is approximately $26,880. Assuming that this employee has 
contributed six per cent of his salary throughout his 20 years of service, the 
total amount of his contributions including interest is approximately $7,202, or 
26,8 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity. 
If this same employee had retired at age 60 with 20 years of service and 
the same final average salary ($4,800), the value of his retirement annuity would 
be approximately $31,920. The employee's contributions to P.E.R.A. including 
interest, would be approximately $7,049 or 22.1 per cent of the val~e of his 
retirement annuity. His contribution total is less at age 60 than it would be 
for 20 years' service at age 65 because he would be at his maximum salary for fewer 
years, according to the actuarial tables and would live longer after retirement. 
If this same employee had retired at age 55 with 30 years of service and 
the same final average salary ($4,800) the value of his retirement annuity would 
be approximately $36,960. The employee's contributions to P.E.R.A., including 
interest, would be approximately $11,590 or 31.3 per cent of the value of his 
retirement annuity. Although this employee would have contributed to P.E.R.A • 
for 30 years instead of 20, he would still be paying less than one-third of the 
cost of his retirement annuity. 
3. Know Your Colorado Retirement Plan, issued by the P.E.R.A. Board of Control. 
On the other hand, this same employee would be paying almost half of his 
retirement annuity if he had worked for 30 years prior to retirement at age 65. 
Assuming a final average salary of $4,800, he would have contributed approximately 
$12,024 or 44.7 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity; yet he would receive 
no greater annuity than an employee who worked 20 years and retired at age 65 after 
contributing 26.8 per cent of his final annuity. 
These examples are not intended as argument either for or against the concept 
that employees should pay: approximately one-half of the cost of their retirement 
annuity. Rather they dispute the commonly held assumption that employees are 
making such contributions at present. 
These examples are based on two premises: 1) that the employee's salary 
increases gradually throughout his period of employment with his. salary level not 
appreciably affected by inflation; and 2) that the employee's rate of contribution 
remains the same throughout his period of employment. If ·this employee had large 
salary increases during his last 10 years of service, ard/or had contributed at a 
lesser rate during the period of significantly lower salary, the portion he would 
have contributed of his final annuity would be less. These conditions would 
reduce the proportion of the retirement annuity financed by the employee, because 
his annuity would be based on a final average salary resulting from the large 
salary increases ard/or because his retirement annuity would be based on the larger 
contribution rate, regardless of the number of years he may have been paying. into 
the retirement furn at a lesser rate. 
Employee Contribution Changes arrl Salary Increases 
Changes in the contribution.rate and the sizable increase in salaries since 
World lfar II has had an effect on the proportion of retirement annuities financed 
through contributions to P .E.R.A. by state, school, and municipal employees .... 
some of whom have already retired. As of June 30, 1958, 88.6 per cent of the 
liabilities for retired or deceased state employees were employer financed.4 
The proportions for the s'chool and municipal division employees were similar; 
85.9 per cent for schools, and 83.7 per cent for municipal.5 Only $1.4 million 
of the $12.3 million liabilities for retired members in the state division as of 
June 30, 1958 were employee financed. Employees financed $314 000 of the $2.2 · 
million liabilities in the school division and $57,000 of the $351,000 liabilities 
in the municipal divisions. One of the reasons for this small proportion of employee 
contributions was the lower contribution rate in effect during the .first ten· 
years or more of service, another was the large salary increases after World. 'War· II 
from which their final average salaries resulted. A significant factor was the · 
prior·service credit granted to those state employees with a considerabl~ number of 
years of service before the retirement system was established in 1931. 
4. Actuarial Valuation, Members and Annuitants, P.E.R.A. of Colorado, A.G. Gabriel, 
June 30, 1958, p. 17. . , . 




When the retirement program was set up, state employees were required to 
contribute at a rate of 3.5 per cent of mont~ly salary. This contribution rate 
obtained until 1949, when, as a result of legislation passed in 1947, the rate 
was increased to five per cent; annuity benefits were also increased. 
In 1957, legislation was passed to increase the rate to six per cent as of 
July 1, 1958. At the same time, survivorship benefits and -deferred annuities were 
added to the plan. 
During the post-war period, there has been a steady increase in state 
employees' salaries. Since 1952, there has been an average annual increase of 
4.7 per cent. Salaries for school administrators and teachers have almost 
doubled since 1946. The rate increase from 1952 to 1958 was 38.5 per cent, or 
almost 6.5 per cent per year. Municipal salaries have increased approximately 20 
per cent since 1954, or five per cent per year. 6 
Employer's Contributions 
The employer's portion of P.E.R.A. retirement annuities comes from the 
contributions made by the participating agencies and political subdivisions. 
These contributions are based on a proportion of ·the payroll for the agency's or 
subdivision's e~ployees who are members of P.E.R.A. The employer's contributions 
as well as the employees' are invested, with the resultant earnings also accruing 
to the retirement fund. l"hile employees who leave P.E.R.A. -- covered service 
1118Y withdraw their contributions, the employers' payments remain in the fund. 
State Division 
During the first four years of the retirement program (1931-1935) the state 
made no contributions to P.E.R.A., or the State Employees Retirement Association, 
as it was then known. Legislation passed in 1935 provided that the state contribute 
at a rate of 3.5 per cent of the total salaries of the members of the retirement 
association; however, these funds were to come only from the delinquent tax 
penalties and interest fund and not from the budgets of the participating agencies 
nor throur,h a special appropriation. There was no provision for making up the 
difference if this source did not produce 3.5 per cent of the retirement membership 
payroll, which was always the case. It should be remembered that these were depression 
years and that it was difficult for the state to meet its major obligations, let 
alone provide funds for the retirement program. 
According to thP. executive secretary of P.E.R.A., the original purpose of the 
delinquent tax penalties and interest fund payments was to cover the state's share 
of prior service credits. The largest amount ever received from the delinquent tax 
penalties and interest fund was $51,784 in 1939, as compared with employees' 
contributions for that year of $177,406. Since 1945, the annual amount has rarely 
exceeded $25,000, with $27,213 in 1947 the highest. 
6. Accurate, comprehensive and comparable data for municipal salaries not available 
prior to 1954. These figures are based on three publications of the Colorado 
Municipal League: 1954 Wage and Salary Survey, Colorado Cities and Towns; ffages 1 
Salaries, Fringe Benefits, 1956, Colorado Cities and 1'owns; and ·wages, Salaries, 
Fringe Benefits, Colorado Cities and Towns, 1958 Supplement. 
For a ten-year period beginning in 1940, the General Assembly appropriated a 
small amount each year to be paid to P.E.R.A. in addition to the funds from 
delinquent· tax penalties and interest. In 1940 and 1941, $25,000 was appropriated 
annually; from 1942 throu~h 1949, the annual appropriation was $35,000. When 
state agencies began budgeting their P.E.R.A. payroll contributions in 1941, the 
retirement fund received employer contributions from three sources. These were 
reduced to two after 1949, when special appropriations were no longer made. 
In 1941, legislation was passed which made it mandatory for state agencies 
which operated on fee funds (such as revenue, agriculture, and fish and game) to 
budget for P.E.R.A. contributions at a rate of 3.5 per cent of payroll -- the same 
rate paid by employees. State agencies whose employees' salaries were payable through 
state general fund appropriations, or from funds in whole or in part derived from 
ad valorem taxes, tuition, or federal aid for extension or educational research, 
could make payroll contributions to P.E.R.A., but were not required to do so. Such 
contributions were made mandatory for all participating state agencies in 1945. 
The employer's contribution rate was raised to five per cent as of July 1, 
1949, and to six per cent as of July 1, 1958, equalling the employees' rate. 
Since 1931, state employees have contributed $18,537,700 to P.E.R.A., and the state 
a total of $17,005,081 from its three sources. A year by year breakdown of 
contributions is shown in Table I on the following page. 
The effect of the state's failure to make contributions to P.E.R.A. equal to 
or in excess of employee contributions, or to finance its share of prior service 
credits will be discussed in the section on Financing P.E.R.A. Retirement Benefits. 
Municipal and School Divisions 
In 1943, when the employees of municipalities and school districts were first 
eli~ible for P.E.R.A. coverar,e, these subdivisions contributed 3.5 per cent of payroll. 
'Ihis rate increased to five per cent July 1, 1949, and to six per cent July 1, 
1958. The employees' rate increased in the same wav. Even though employer 
contributions matched those ma'de by the employee, neither of these divisions has 
met the cost of its retirement program, although their unfumed liabilities are 
not as 1 extensive as those of the state division. 'lhe financing of these two 
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6/30/37 132,430.63 $39,559.14 
6/30/38 157,592.69 42,221.96 
6/30/39 177,406.23 51,784.14 
6/30/40 202,397.96 49,512.51 $25,ooo.oo 
6/30/41 208,086.06 46,189.44 2s,ooo.oo 
6/30/42 251,566.28 50,811.44 35,000.00 $91,632.75 
6/30/43 200,671.55 371401.22 35,000.00 91,306.66 
6/30/44 218,198.14 33,245.ll ss,000.00 100,306.27 
6/30/45 236,849.07 24,581.70 35,000.00 107,392.95 
6/30/46 313,991.62 27,212.82 as,000 .. 00 212,320.3'1 
6/30/47 381,909.66 21,204.58 35,000.00 204,761.42 
6/30/48 503,529.78 20,107,59 35,ooo.oo 442,034.14 
6/30/49 637,245.69 18,928.57 35,000.00 586,485.16 
6/30/50 1,054,266.70 16,995.54 993,242.57 
6/30/51 1,170,026.81 16,717.86 1,174,2'18.82 
6/30/52 1,295,264.44 25,091.17 1,246,757.28 
6/30/53 1,398,670.28 20,126~68 1,352,529.22 
6/30/54 1,564,164.25 19,954,08 1,507,732.00 
6/30/55 1,608,851.98 22,136.26 1,623,247.53 
6/30/56 1,792,038.50 20,037.37 1,737,891.12 
6/30/57 2,oao,aas.10 25,775.74 2,016,611.71 
6/30/58 214801846,57 27 1092.14 214492813,70 
TOTAIS $18,537,700.11 $656,607.06 $330,000.00 $16,018,393.67 
Total State Contributions: $17,oos.oao,73 
a. Source: Executive Secretary, Public Employees Retirement Association. 
b. Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Fund. 
Financing P.E.R.A. Retirement Benefits 
An actuarial valuation of the several divisions of P.E.R.A. is made every 
five years by the system's consulting actuary. The most recent valuation of 
P.E.R.A. was made as of June 30, 1958. In making an actuarial valuation an inventory 
is made of the system's liabilities and assets. The liabilities are computed in part 
on predictions based on actuarial experience. This includes items such as the time 
present employees will re tire am the value of their annuities according to the 
mortality tables; the employee turnover rate, which determines the amount of future 
refunds, as well as the amount of employer's contributions, which will remain in 
the fund; and the final average salary of present retirement system members. In 
- 11 -
computing the system's assets, certain other actuarial predictions are made, such 
as future contributions to the system am the amount of interest to be earned on 
investment. An interest rate is assumed based on investment experience am is used 
for all of these calculations. Liabilities am assets are presented in an 
ac-tuarial balance sheet and ttay be divided into accrued liabilities and assets and 
prospective liabilities and assets. 
Accrued liabilities include the present value (in this case as of June 30, 
1958) of: 
1) accrued portions of superannuation annuities likely to be paid present 
members, based on service rendered before July 1,. 1958; 
2) expected future refunds of amounts deducted from members' salaries before 
July 1, 1958; and 
3) liabilities for present members·who have retired or whose beneficiaries 
are receiving ·survivor benefits. 
Accrued Assets include the funds on hand from both employer and employee 
contributions as of June 30, 1958. 
Prospective liabilities include the present value (June 30, 1958) ofs 
1) prospective portions of superannuation annuities likely to be paid 
present members based on services to be rendered after June 30, 1958; 
2) disability annuities likely to be paid present members; 
3) death-in-service annuities likely to be paid on account of the death of 
present members; and 
4) expected future refunds of amounts to be deducted from members' stlaries 
after June 30, 1958. 
Prospective assets include the present value (June 30, 1958) of: 
1) expected future contributions to be made by present members; and 
2) expected future contributions by employer to meet prospective liabilities. 
Accrued assets and accrued liabilities are balanced, and if there is any 
deficit, it is identified as the accrued unfurded liability. The ex~stence of an 
accrued unfunded liability indicates that sufficient contributions including interest 
had not been paid into the retirement fund as of the date of the actuarial valuation 
to cover the retirement benefit credits already earned by active and retired members. 
Prospective assets and liabilities are also balanced.and equal each other 
because the employer's contribution rate is set at that proportion of prospective 
payroll which will produce an amount equal to the difference between the employees' 
prospective contributions and the total prospective liabilities. This process is 








As of June 30, 1958, the state division of P.E.R.A. had total liabilities of 
$110,841,436.7 Of this amount, $62,856,268 were accrued liabilities, that is, 
liabilities incurred from credits earned by present and retired members. 'lhese 
accrued liabilities are broken down as followsi 
1) accrued portions of superannuation annuities for service already rendered 
by present members ••.......................... -: .................•....•.• $47 ,565 9 982 
2) expected future refunds of members' deduc'tions made before July 1, 
1958 • .•.•....•.........................................•..........•.•.. $ 3,012, 942 
3) annuitant and survivor benefit reserve liabilities •••••••••• •• $12,277,344 
$62,856,268 
Prospective liabilities totaled $47,985,168 and included the following: 
1) prospective portions of superannuation annuities likely to be ~aid present 
members for services rendered after June 30, 1958 •••••••••••••••••••••• $31,512,564 
2) disability annuities likely to be paid present members •••••••• $ 1,663,258 
3) death-in-service annuities likely to be paid on account of the death of 
present members•••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••$ 3,151,937 
4) expected future refunds of deductions to be made after June 30 1958, by 
present members •••••••••••••••••••• .- ••••••••••••••••• -•••••••••••••••••• $11 1657, 909 
$47,985,168 
Prospective liabilities are balanced from two sources: 
1) the present value of expected future contributions by present members; and 
2) the present value of state contributions necessary to finance future 
liabilities. The present value of expected future employee contributions is 
$26,384,080, based on six per cent of salary. This means that the state as 
employer will have to contribute $21,601,088. This amount will be financed through 
a state contribution rate of 4.94 per cent of members' payroll as calculated by the 
actuary. This 4.94 per cent makes up the major portion of the state's total 




4.09 per cent 
.30 per cent 
.55 per cent 
4.94 per cent 
7. Actuarial Valuation, Members and Annuitants op. cit., p. 18 and following. All 
actuarial and financial data in this section are based on this report unless 
otherwise indicated. 
This funding of future liabilities is known as current service financing. 
~11 expected future liabilities are segregated and financed through current 
contributions of both employer and employee. An additional contribution on the 
part of the employer might be necessary, however, to finance unfunded accru'ed 
liabilities if such exist. 
'Ihe accrued liabilities of almost $63 million are offset by accrued or 
ledger assets. These include employer and employee accumulated contributions 
with interest. As of June 30, 1958, these assets in the .state division of P.E.R.A. 
totaled $27,586,658. When these accrued assets are subtracted from accrued liabilities, 
an unfunded accrued liability of $35,269,610 remains. This unfunded accrued 
liability exists because past employee and employer contributions including 
interest have failed to approxim~te accrued liabilities, for the following reasons: 
1) Prior service credits. For service before 1931, neither the state nor 
the employee paid; for prior service F:ranted after 1931, employees have contributed, 
but not the state to any great extent. The executive secretary of P.E.R.A. estimates 
the state's unpaid share of prior service credits as slightly in excess of $12 
million, .or more than a third of the total unfunded accrued liability. 
2) Further deficit in state contributions. In addition to the deficit in 
the state 1s prior service credit contributions, the state has not contributed 
sufficiently over the years to handle its share of current service financing. 
3) Salary Increases. 'lhe relatively recent salary increases have increased 
the cost of the retirement plan as employees' retirement annuities are based on 
final average·salary. 
4) Increase in Longevity. P.E.R.A. has adopted a new mortality table in 
line with the increased life expectancies of annuitants. This means that retired 
members of P.E.R.A. are living longer, which raises the value of their annuities 
and increases the cost of the program. 
5) Increase in maximum retirement annui rior to a e 65. Retirement costs 
have also ncreased, because the maximum annuity for those members retiring prior 
to age 65 has been raised from $200 per month to $300. 
In a sense, this unfunded accrued liability is similar to the national debt, 
in that it becomes payable over a period of/yflars, rather than all at once. As 
long as the retirement system continues , current income can be used ·to fund these 
liabilities as they become due. Future unfunded accrued liabilities resulting fr<lll 
the use of current income to cover past unfunded accrued liabilities, in turn, may 
also be financed in the same way. 
To keep the unfunded accrued liability from continuing to grow, it is necessary 
to meet the interest payment on this debt. 'lhe unfurded accrued liability represent• 
$35 million which is not availab1e to be invested. At the interest rate assumed 
by the actuary (2.5 per cent), the state division is losing $881,700 in interest 
annually. 'Ihi's interest deficit can be met through an additional payroll contribution 
on the part ~f. the employer, the employee, or both. 
The P.E.R.A_. actuary has computed this rate at 1.76 per cent· of payroll to be 
added.to the state's contribution. When this is added to the 4.94 per cent 








contribution rate 6.7 per cent of members' payroll. As the state is presently 
contributing six per cent, only .7 per cent instead of 1.76 per cent is being 
provided to meet the interest on the accrued unfunded liability. Consequently, at 
the present contribution rate, the accrued unfunded liability will continue to 
increase at a minimum of $381,000 per year, or the amount of interest not being 
provided (assuming no increases in payroll). 
The unfunded accrued liability as of June 30, 1953 (the date ~f the previous 
actuarial valuation) was·$10.8 million, as compared with the present $35 million. 
However, the total liability of the state division at that time was only $33 million, 
as compared with almost $111 million in 1958. The accrued unfunded liability was 
32.6 per cent of total liabilities in 1953, as compared with 31.8 per cent in 1958. 
The accrued unfunded liability has increased 218 per cent from 1953 to 1958, _while 
total liabilities have increased 236 per cent. This increase in the accrued 
unfunded liability was caused by the reasons already enumerated. 
In 1953, _the actuary computed the state's contribution rate for current service 
financing at 5.28 per cent, with an additional .92 per cent necessary to meet the 
interest on the $11 million unfunded liability at that time. The state continued 
to contribute at a rate of five per cent until July 1, 1958, so that not only was 
the interest on the accrued unfunded li~bili ty no·t met, but neither were the costs 
of current financing. 
Failure to meet the interest requirements on the accrued unfunded liability 
in 1953 added another $1.4 million to the unfunded liability over the five-year 
period. 'Approximately $700,000 more resulted from the state's failure to contribute 
at the level determined necessary in 1953 to finance current service costs. Since 
these items account for less than 10 per cent of the five-year increase in accrued 
unfunood liability, it appears that the major reasons are: 1) the change in life 
exp~ctancy for present and future annuitants; and 2) the increase in state salaries. 
The payroll for the members of the state division increased from $29 million 
in 1953 to $49 million in 1958. Approximately half of this increase resulted 
from addition~! employees joining state service, ard the other half from salary 
increases. In 1953, the 8,336 members of the state division had an average annual 
salary of $3,502. In 1958, the 11,288 members of the state division had an average 
salary of $4,371, an increase of 24.8 per cent over 1953. A retirement annuity for 
a state employee with 20 years service at age 65, based on a final average salary 
of $4,371, has a vaiue of $4,861 more than a similar annuity for an employee with a 
final average salary of $3,502. This is but one example of the effect of salary 
increases on the cost of the retirement program. 
Should the current trend of general salary increases continue, it is likely 
that the unfunded accrued liability will continue to grow, al though these increases . 
will be offset to some extent by a larger payroll upon which contributions would 
be based. Any further increase in longevity would also increase retirement program· . 
costs. 
There are several approaches which might be taken toward meeting the unfunded 
accrued liability. First, the state as employer can continue to follow its present 
policy -- one of meetin~ partially the interest requirements, with a resultant 
continuing unfunded liability increase for this reason alone. Second, the ~tate 
can increase its contribution ·to the extent necessary to meet the interest on the 
unfunded liability. If this is done, the unfunded liability will not increase, 
assuming other factors remain stable. 'Ihird, the unfunded liability could be 
amortized over a period of 20 to 40 years through an increase in the contribution 
rate on the part of the employer, the employee, or both • . ,.) If .employee rates are 
increased, present employees who are paying their share of>current benefits• 
will be asked to pay for benefits not financed in the past. · They will also be 
asked. to make up, a:t least in part, for the failure of the state to provide its 
share of the co~ts in the past. A further question is what. proportion of salary 
should state employees contribute to their retirement program. 
If the state were to amortize the unfunded liability over a 35 year period 
through an increase in payroll contributions, it would cost an estimated 7 .98 per 
cent of payroll, assuming that the employees would continu·e to contribute at a, six 
per cent rate. This would be 3.04 per cent more than th'e present 4.94 per cent 
contribution for current service financing, 1.98 per cent more than the state is 
now . contributing, and 1.28 per cent more than the rate the state should be paying 
to meet the interest requirements on the unfunded liability. After the present 
accrued unfunded liability is retired in 1994, the state rate· would return to 4.94 
per cent, as compared with six per cent for employees, uniess there were continued 
increases in the unfunded acc~ued liability which would make it impossible to 
amortize it by that time. 
Interest on Investments 
It has been suggested that the interest requirements of the unfunded liability 
mi~ht be met at least in part by an increase in the earning yd.elds on present and 
future investments in the state divisions of P.E.R.A. 
In making the actuarial valuation, the interest rate assumed by the actuary 
for all divisions of P.E.R.A. was 2.5 per cent, the same as for the accrued unfunded 
liability. This rate is applied to the ledger or accrued assets. 
As of June 30, 1958, the state division had accrued assets of almost $27.6 
million; 2.5 per cent of this amount would be $690,000. During the year ending 
June: 30, 1958, the state divis.fon realized a gross interest return of $663,000. 
Added to this was a net total of $57,000, the difference between profit earned on 
redeemed investments and commissions paid on the purchase of new ones. When 
the state division•~ prorated share of administrative expenses ($61 1000) is 
deducted, it leaves·a net return of $659,000.8 However, $4 million in securities 
at ~n '. interest yield rate of four per cent were purchased too near the end of 
the fiscal year . to realize any investment return, and another $3 million at varied 
rates of interest (all 2.5 per cent or more) were purchased too near the end of the 
fiscal year to realize full return on investment. Assuming approximately the 
same amount of administrative expense, these investments should produce approxi.,tel.y 
$789.000 in earnings during the 1958-59 fiscal year, or 2.86 per cent of assets. 
8. Public E lo ees Retirement Association of Colorado 
nnual Audit as o June 30, 1958 alter • eider and ompany, enver. 
9. P~E.R.A. has computed the effective yield on the present investment portfolio at 
3.04 per cent. From the above calculations, this would appear to be the 
approximate expected gross yield for the 1958-59 fiscal year. Actually, the 
rate of return would be lower if the yield were computed on the assets in the 
fund as of June 30, 1959. These yield rates are computations based on assets 















The anticipated excess interest fov 1959, .36 per cent, would provide only 
about $100,000 of the required $381,000 of unfunded interest. Such comparisons are, 
however, invalid and, in fact, improper, since the only method of correctly measuring 
the effect of the continuation of such.excess earnings is to change the interest 
assumptions underlying the actuarial calculations. If such change is made in the 
assumptions, however, reductions will be necessary not only in the liability items 
but also in the prospective asset items, the combination of which might not produce 
the amount of reduction in unfunded liabilities anticipated. 
By law, the retirement board of P.E.R.A. is limited in the investment of funds 
to the following: 
1) bonds and warrants of the United States of America; 
2) bonds arxi warrants of the State of Colorado; 
3) certain general obligation bonds of Colorado cities, towns, and school 
districts; and 
4) promissory notes secured by first lien mortgages or deeds of trust on real 
estate situated in Colorado and guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government. 
It would necessitate a statutory amendment, if the retirement board desired to 
improve its interest rate through purchase of blue chip stocks or top-rated private 
industry and utility bonds. 
School and Municipal Divisions 
Actuarial valuations are also made at the same five-year intervals for the school 
and municipal divisions. As of June 30, 1958, neither division showed as large an 
unfunded accrued liability as the·state division. The school division had an 
unfunded accrued liability of $14.9 million and the nrunicipal division, $547,144. 
There are several reasons why the unfunded accrued liabilities are less in these 
two divisions than in the state division. First, neither division granted prior 
service credits. Second, employers in both divisions have always contributed at the 
same rate as employees since both divisions were created in 1943. Third, a greater 
proportion of the liabilities in the school and municipal divisions are prospective, 
rather than accrued -- approximately 65 per cent for the school division and 59 
per cent for the municipal division, as compared with 44 per cent for the state 
division. Both of these divisions are 12 years younger than the state division 
and therefore have retired fewer people, as well as having less accrued service 
credits for present members. Fourth, the municipal division has so few members 
that its total liabilities of $7.7 million are only 22 per cent as large as the 
state division's unfunded accrued liability. 
The school division's unfunded accrued liability has increased from $639,000 
in 1953 to almost $15 million in 1958. The large increase in school administrative 
and teaching salaries has been largely responsible for this rise. The average 
salary for the 8,347 school division members in 1953 was $3,156. In 1958, the 
average salary was $3,981 for the 14,489 members -- an increase of 26.2 per cent. 
Another reason for the increase in unfunded accrued liabilities was the 
failure of the employers in the school division to contribute the 1953 actuarially: 
determined rate of 5.66 per cent of the members' payroll. Only a small portion of 
this total, .06 per cent, was required to meet the interest on the accrued deficit 
at. that time; the remainder was allocated for current service financing. As was 
the case with the state division, school division employers continued to contribute 
at the five per cent rate until July 1, 1958. 
In order to meet the interest requirements of the school division's present 
unfunded accrued liabi 1i ty, a contribution rate of .65 pe·r cent is considered 
necessary. The cost of current service financing is 5.87 per cent, bringing the 
total contribution rate to 6.52 per cent. The school division employers are currently 
contributing at a six per cent rate. Consequently, nearly $300,000 annually in 
interest on the unfunded accrued liability is not being financed by; the present 
contribution rate. · 
The municipal division did not have any accrued unfunded liability in 1953; 
rather, this d-ivision had a $300,000 surplus. This surplus, plus the five per cent 
contribution rate by municipal employers, when only 4.46 per cent was necessary 
tor current service financing, were the reasons that the eresent municipal division 
unfunded accrued liability is only sli¢,tly in ex~ess of $500,000 dollars. Municipal 
salaries have also been on the rise. '!he average salary for the 845 municipal 
members in 1953 was $3,350. In 1958 the average salary was $3,995 for the 1,129 
members, an increase of 19.2 per cent. The six per cent contribution rate also 
maintained for municipal employers will be sufficient to handle current service 
financing and amortize the accrued unfunded liability in 15.2 years. '!he total 
current service contribution rate is 5.03 per cent, with an additional .97 per 
cent to amortize the accrued unfunded liability. The municipal division, therefore, 
is the only one of the three which has any prospect of amortizing its accrued 
unfunded liability at present contribution rates. 
Miscellaneous P.E.R.A. Provisions 
Contribution Refunds 
Members who leave P.E.R.A. covered employment may withdraw their accumulated 
contributions without interest; however, their $5 membership fees are retained by 
P.E~i.A. As has been indicated above, members with at least five years of service 
may choose to leave contributions in the fund atxl receive a deferred annuity at 
age 65. 
When P.E.R.A. was set up· in 1931, the statues provided that members who left 
state service could withdraw their accumulated contributions with 2.5 per cent 
interest compounded semiannually. '!his provision was amended in 1935 to e'xclude 
the payment of interest on accumulated contributions. This amendment was nm.de 
because the small accumulation of assets made it difficult for the retirement fund 
to return contributions with interest and meet other obligations. 
Administration of P.E.R.A. 
A retirement board not to exceed 13 members is charged by statute with the 
responsibility for managing P.E.R.A. Three members of this board are state officials 





auditor. Four board members represent the state division and are elected to serve 
stag~ered four-year terms. The school and municipal divisions are also entitled 
to representation on the board and may elect one board member for each 1,000 members, 
not to exceed a· total of three. As presently constituted, the board consists of the 
three state officials, four representatives of the state division, three representatives 
of the school division and one representative of the municipal division, which.has 
slightly in exc~ss of 1,100 members. 
Originally the reti~ement board consisted of seven members, but the number was 
increased in 1943 to provide for representation of school and municipal members, who 
became eligible for participation at that time. 
The board is empowered to establish the rules and regulations for the administratior, 
of the retirement fund and to require that public employers furnish and keep such 
records as the board deems necessary for the discharge of its duties. 'lhe retirement 
board elects its own chairman and has the authority to appoint an execut'ive secretary 
and such other employees as are considered necessary. The board also has the final 
power to determine the status of any state employee in respect to any provision 
of the retirement program. An executive secretary is employed by the _board, who 
serves as the retirement pro~ram administrator. Administrative expenses in the 
1957-58 fiscal year totaled $145,423t which was apportioned among the f~ur P.E.R.A. 
divisions, according to each division's proportion of total membership., The school 
division, h.aving the largest membership, was assessed $77,146 for administrative 
expenses; the state division, $61,571; the municipal division, $6,044; and judges• 
division, $662. 
Problems of Coverage Under P.E.R.A. 
All full-time permanent employees of the state and those political subdivisions 
participating in the P.E.R.A. program, except for those categories of employees 
already cite~, are required to be members of P.E.R.A. For a variety of reasons, 
some of these employees are not covered, and there is no legal requirement that 
coverage be provided for temporary and/or part-time employees. 
State Division 
The State Controller, in a memorandum dated November 1, 1950, set forth the 
rule for determining temporary arxl. permanent employees: 
"Temporary employees shall be deemed to be those employed to 
fill a specific 'temporary position, where such position is approved 
by the Civil Service Commission and the Governor's office as a 
temporary one. Likewise, those employed continuously for a period 
less than one year shall.be deemed to be employees assigned to a 
specific posi'tion of less than one year's duration. Accordingly, 
if the position is permanent and continuing; the employee assigned 
is also permanent (for the applicatiomof the retirement deduction)t 
unless the term of employment is for a specific period of time · 
less than one yea~. Whether or not the employee is certified 
into the classified service, or on a provisional" basis, is immaterial." 
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Administrators of the P.E.R.A. program are of the opinion that state department 
and agerey heads have placed to~ loose a construction upon the word "temporary" in 
determining whether an employee should be covered by the retirement act. The State 
Highway Department and the State Hospital classify employees who work for six months 
or less as temporary. Other agencies generally use an employment per,iod of 12 
months to determine whether an employee may be considered permanent for the purposes 
of retirement coverage. 
The P.E.R.A. retirement board has appeared reluctant to make an issue of 
requiring eligible employees to participate in the retirement program even though 
it has the authority to do so. The executive secretary of P.E.R.A. ttas pointed 
out that there are no penalties provided by law which may be imposed upon agencies 
or employees for not joining. It would seem, however, that an~ttor~~y general's 
opinion on the matter mi~ht be a sufficient mandate to require compliance. 
In addition to those employees of various state agencies who may or may not 
be permanent employees, there are approximately 5 1000 who are actually temporary, 
part-time, or ·exempt from P.E.R.A. coverage.10 The greatest number of these 
employees were classified as temporary and were found to be employed principally 
by the universities and colleges (4 1000); state hospital (244); State Home and 
?raining Schools at Ridge and Grand Junction (205); Department of Aqiculture (53)J 
Office of the State Engineer (49); and the State Highway Department. 
These employees are provided with no retirement coverage at all while in the 
employ of the state. It has been suggested that coverage might be provided for these 
people throu~h a statutory change in the definition of P.E.R.A. eligibility, such 
change to make coverage mandatory for any employees who are on the payroll longer 
than 90 days or six months. This approach confuses P.E.R.A. membership with effective 
retirement coverage. Bona fide temporary or part-time employees would be required 
to contribute to P.E.R.A. as would the employing agencies. These employees would have 
their contributions returned upon leaving state service, the employing agency would 
have added expense because its contributions would remain in the fund, and P.E.R.A. 
would have an added administrative burden in handling, accounting for, and returning 
funds. Most temporary employees can ill afford to have six per cent deducted from 
their earnings, and such deductions accomplish no purpose if they are merely forced 
savings rather than contributions toward earned retirement credits. 
Coverage of these temporary and part-time employees under Old Age Survivors 
am Disability Insurance (O.A.S.D.I.) is one possible solution to the problem. 
The ways in which such coverage can be accomplished are discussed in subsequent 
chapters of this report. If these employees are placed under O.A.S.D.I., however,;· 
there is a question as to what course should be followed if any of them ultimatley 
become full-time, permanent employees. They would then become eligible for P.E.R.A., 
10. 
11. 
A Legislative Council state payroll su:nrey which .c~vered the 1956-57 fiscal 
year showed that on the average 4,670 state employees who drew warrants each 
m~nth were not covered by P.E.R.A. In addition, the State Highway Department 
h1res several hundred laborers each year on a temporary basis. 
Legislative Council Memorandum to the Forty-first General Assembly on Public 








which is not now combined in ay way with O .A. S .D. I. Either these employees would 
have to ~ive up O.A.S.D.I. or would be required to carry both O.A.S.D.I. and 
P.E.R.A. coverage. The latter course would impose a high contribution rate 
(10.5 per cent on first $4,800 of salary, by 1969) upon employer and employee 
alike and would result in a few employees (those covered by both P.E.R.A. and 
O.A.S.D.I.) receiving much greater retirement benefits than their co-workers 
covered only by P.E.R.A. 
School and Municipal Divi.sion 
The school and municipal divisions also have some temporary and part-time 
employees, who at present do not have any retirement coverage. The problem is not 
as great as with the state division, and some school districts, according to the 
executive secretary of P.E.R..A., are declaring some of these employees, such as 
lunch room workers and custodial workers, eligible for P.E.R.A. Whether this is 
a satisfactory solution will depend on whether these employees work a sufficient 
length of time to be eligible for a substantial retirement benefit under P.E.R.A. 
lhere is a further coverage problem in three of the member cities of the 
municipal division. Arvada, Fort Morgan, am Gunnison have indicated a desire on 
the part of both employees·and employers to be removed from P.E.R.A. coverage and 
to obtain O.A.S.D.I. coverage instead. Under present law, there is no way in 
tmich these cities can terminate P.E.R.A. membership. There is also no way 
under present federal social security laws and regulations that these cities could 
become covered by O.A.S.D.I. if they drop P.E.R.A. first.12 
All three of these cities were contacted by the Legislative Council staff, 
and the problem was discussed with both employees and city officials. 
Arvada 
Arvada has 27 employees classified as permanent and full-time, and all 27 
are presently covered by P.E.R.A. The city manager has indicated that both the 
city and the employees wanted ·to get out of P.E.R.A. and secure O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage and added that Arvada has been trying to do this for several years. He 
emphasized that the city was not overly converned about the six per cent contribution 
rate, but that employee turnover rendered P.E.R.A. useless in Arvada. Only one 
employee at present appears to have the possibility of retiring under P.E.R.A. 
Fort Morgan 
Fort Morgan has 66 permanent full-time employees, and only 19 of them are 
covered by P.E.R.A. The 47 not covered object to being included, and apparently 
the city administration is sympathetic to their viewpoint. At a meeting of 65 
employees and city coun~il members, the employees voted unanimously to substitute 
O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A., even after the provisions and advantages of P.E.R.A. were 
discussed. Several of the 19 covered employees indicated that they would be willing 
to forgo their P.E.R.A. benefits in order to get the situation straightened out • 
12. The possibilities of accomplishing what the three cities wish will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters of this report dealing with O.A.S.D.I. and public 
employee retirement systems. 
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Employee turnover and the lack of a career service are the major reasons why FoM 
Morgan finds P.E.R.A. unacceptable. Fort Morgan accepted P.E.R.A. coverage in 
1943 in order to do something for its employees when O .A. S.D .I. coverage was not 
possible for public employees. l·ben such coverage was made available in· 1950, the 
city was unable to avail itself of it, because of its P.E.R.A. membership. 
Gunnison 
The city of Gunnison has 20 full-time employees of which only two are covered 
by P .E.R.A. One of these two employees is an elected official, who requested 
inclusion under P .E .R .A. There are two reasons why Gunnison has not forced its 
employees under P.E.R.A. First, Gunnison has an annual employee turnover rate of 
about 30 per cent. Second, the employees, most of whom are in the low salary 
brackets, do not wa,nt such large deductions taken from their pay check, especially 
since most of them are transient. The mayor and city manager were of the opinion 
that any improvement in the retirement program or any fringe.benefits would have 
little effect on the turnover rate. The municipal salary scale is unfavorable when 
compared with private employment in unskilled jobs, and it is this relationship 
which cause.s the high rate of turnover. With one exception, employees and officials 
were in agreement on their desire to substitute O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A. 
Legally all full-time permanent employees of these municipalities are required 
to be members of P.E.R.A. But the retirement board has not forced compliance even 
though it has the authority to do so. This policy of partial coverage in Fort 
Morgan and Gunnison has not provided a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
The other five municipal members of P.E.R.A. (Alamosa, Boulder, Colorado 
Springs, Pueblo, and Wray) appear_ generally satisfied with P.E.R.A.,at least to 
the extent that none of them wishes to do away with P.E.R.A. entirely. Boulder 
has expressed interest, as have a number of Pueblo employees, in a combination 
of P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. 
Boulder, Colorado Springs, arrl Pueblo are large enough, with adequate salary 
scales, to have career service programs. P.E.R.A. fits in more with this employment 
situation than in those cities with a high annual turnover rate. 
The member cities of P.E.R.A. which have the highest rate of employee turnover, 
such as Fort Morgan arrl Gunnison, feel that their employee contributions are going 
to finance retirement of career service employees in other cities. One way to 
avoid this resentment would be to establish each city as a separate retirement system 
with its contributio~ rates based upon its own actuarial experience; such a method, 
however, would entail large administrative costs. Other methods can be found to 
produce the desired objective with only moderate increases in administrative costs. 
Older Employees and P.E.R.A. 
Another problem of some importance is the number of older employees who reach 
age 65 or more without sufficient years of service to provide them with more than 
a small retirement benefit under P.E.R.A. This is especially a problem in the school 
division where, as of June 30, 1958, 530 employees over the age of 59 had four 
years of service or less. This group comprises one-third of the school division 
membership in this age category. Almost 20 per cent of all state members over 59 









Table II shows the number of older employees in each division by age group 
who have less than four years service and those with 5-9 years service. Also 









Older Employees Covered by P.E.R.A., Age, and 
Years of Service, June 30, 19588 
State School 
yee'rs 5-9 years 0-4 years 5-9 years 0-4 
Pct.b No. Pct.b . b '.No. Pct.b No. No. Pct. 
28.3% 73 12 .5% 253 41.2% 229 ~7 .3% 25 
21.5 140 26.2 139 28.4 217 44.4 i2 
11.5 176 25.9 138 28.9 216 45.3 9 
19.9¾ 389 21.6% 530 33.5% 662 41.9% 46 
!!nici:eal 
years 5-9 yearsb 
Pct.b No. .Pct. 
32.5% 30 ~8.9% 
28.6 i6 38.1 
13.8 30 46.1 
25.0% 76 42.4% 
a. Source r Actuarial Valuation1 Members and Annuitants 1 P.E.R.A. of Colorado, 
June 30, 1958. 
b. Per cent of members in age group. 
Employees who have reached their 59th birthday with less than 10 years service 
would have a maximum of 15 years service by age 65. 'Ibis means that macy of them 
would not be eligible for a full ·retirement ar111.ui ty until age 70, and some would 
have to work longer than that. Altogether, 747 older state employees fall into 
this category, as do 1,192 school employees, and 124 municipal employees. This 
group includes 40.5 per cent of state employees over the age of 59, 75.4 per cent 
of school employees over age 59 and 67.4 per cent of municipal employees over 
age 59. 
Most of these employees obviously have entered public service well past their 
55th birthday and it can be argued that the employer therefore has no obligation 
to provide retirement benefits beyond those which accrue from their short period 
of public service. It should be remembered, however, that many of these employees 
have had O.A.S.D.I. covera~e prior to entering P.E.R.A. covered public employment. 
During the years in which they work in P.E.R.A. covered employment, no contributions 
are made to O.A.S.D.J. and consequently their salary credits' under O.A.S.D.I. are 
reduced. As a result, these employees receive a small retirement benefit from each 
source, the total of which may be less than that provided by the Colorado Old 
Af!.e' P.ension. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that many of these employees 
are in the low salary bracket hired at an advanced age to perform custodial work 
and other unskilled services. A P.E.R.A. retirement benefit for an emplo~e making 
$225 per month with five year's service at age 65 would be $28 per month. If he 
has only a small benefit from O.A.S.D.I. and no other income, his only alternatives 
are to continue working or to go on the old age pension. A_question may be raised 
as to the efficiency of some of these older employees, especially as they approach 
70. It is possible that the state and other public employers may consider manda,tory 
retirement as a means of removing older, less efficient workers from public service. 
In taking such a . step, retirement provisions for these older workers should be 
carefully examined to see if any improvements can be made which would neither be too 
closely or unfair to the long-term career service employee. 
P .E.R,A. as a Career Service Retirement Plan 
The normal working career is usually considered a5 30 years or more, yet the 
maximum ·amount of P.E.R.A. retirement benefits are based on 20 years~ service by 
age 65. Employees who work more years for the state are penalized, because they 
continue to pay into P.E.R.A. without any further increase in benefits. 
The present plan also encourages employees to retire from P.E.R.A. covered 
employment at an early enough age to acquire O.A.S.D.I. benefits or retirement 
benefits in another plan through additional employment, An employee is able to 
do this in one or two ways 1 
1) He can retire from P.E.R.A. covered employment at any age arter 35 years' 
service, at age 55 with 30 years' service, or at age 60 with 20 years' service and 
draw P.E.R.A. retirement benefits up to $300 per month for life, and see~ other 
employment. 
2j Any P.E.R.A, _covered employee who works for at least five years aan 
~hange,his employment and receive a deferred anrmity from P.E.R.A. at age 65. This 
makes it possi~le for an employee in his forties, at the peak of his career,. to 
leave P.E.R.A. covered employment and even leave the state and still be able 
to draw a deferred annuity at age 65 based on fifteen years or more of service. 
P.'E.R,A. is especially advantageous to the employee who .enters covered public 
eervice at age 40 or later, as he will receive the same retirement benefits as the 
employee who enters covered public service at 25 or 30. 
For these reasons, P.E.R.A. should be re-examined in light of public employment 
personnel practices to see whether modifications may be needed in keeping with the 
concepts of career service. 
A Re-examination of P.E.R.A. is Desirable 
The next chapters of this report deal with the possibilities and the pros and 
cons of combining P.E.R.A. with O.A.S.D.l. ·Even if none of these combinations 
prove_ acceptable to the General Assembly and public employees, it is still 
desirable that P~E.R.A. be re-examined in light of some of the present problems to 
see if adequate solutions can be found within the framework of the present 
retirement program, 
In brief these problems inclooe: 
1) the financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present accrued 
unfunded liabilities; 
2) the present financing by the employer of· 70 to 75 per cent of each 
retirement annuity; 
3) the lack of retirement coverage for temporary, part-time,. and some full-
time employees J 
. 4) the dissatisfaction with P,E,R.A. expressed by three municipal member 
.cities and their employees; 
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5) the employees entering P.E.R.A. covered service at an advanced age, 
especially in low salary jobs, who are eligible only for small retirement 
annuities; and 




O.A.S.D.I. COVERAGE FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Prior to 1950, state and local government employees were not eligible for 
coverage under Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance. Between 1950 and 1954, 
coverage was possible only for public employees who did not belong to a public: 
employees• retirement system such as P.E.R.A. Public Law 761 passed by the 83r~ 
Congress in 1954 amended the Social Security Act so as to extend coverage under 
O.A.S.D.I. to state and local government employees covered by retirement systems 
upon favorable referendum vote of the covered members. 
Public Law 880 passed during the second session of the 84th Congress in 1956 
further liberalized the provisions for extending O.A.S.D.I. coverage to members of 
public employee retirement programs. It authorized certain specified states am 
their subdivisions which have retirement systems to divide such systems into two 
groups: one in which the retirement plan would be combined with O.A.S.D.I. and 
the second in which the retirement system would continue without combination with 
O.A.S.D.I. This change permitted referendum to be held in which each member of 
the retirement system would determine to which plan he wanted to belong. All new 
employees would automatically become members of the combined plan. The named states 
specifically asked for such designation, and other states have been added at their 
own request. 
O.A.S.D.I.: What It Is 
The federal social security act was passed in 1935 and since that time has 
been amended several times. It provided originally for a national program for 
~etirement and survivor benefits through employer and employee contributions. 
Disability benefits were added in 1954, and further amended in 1956 and 1958. 
Federal officials estimate that at least 92 per cent of the jobs in the United 
States are covered by the O.A~S.D.I. program. Primary retirement benefits currently 
range between a minimum of $33 and a maximum of $127, depending upon average monthly 
wage. An additional benefit is pay~ble to a retirant's wife. This spouse's 
benefit is equal to one-half of the husband's primary insurance benefit if the wife 
has reached age 62. 
Survivorship benefits for the wife and family of a fully insured individual 
upon his death are p~yable up to a maximum of $254 depending on the number of 
children under the age of 18 and the average salary of the insured individual. Dis-
ability benefits are also payable in an amount equal to the primary insurance 
benefit for disabled fully insured individuals who have attained their 50th birth-
day and who have submitted proper proof of such disability. Public Law 840 passed 
by the 85th Congress in 1958 further liberalized disability benefits by providing 
that under certain conditions additional payments may be added to the wife and/or 
children of a disabled worker. 
Contribution rates for O.A.S.D.I. are currently 2.6 per cent of the first 
$4,800 of annual salary for both employer and employee. These rates are scheduled 
to increase to three per cent in 1960, 3.5 per cent in 1963, four per cent in 1966, 
and 4.5 per cent in 1969. 
O.A.s.n.r. Coverage for Colorado Employees 
The Thirty-eighth General Assembly in 1951 passed legislation to make it 
~ possible for local government employees not part of a retirement system to be 
covered under O.A.S.D.r. 1 Such legislation was necessary before the state could 
enter into an agreement with the federal government for these local government 
employees. This legislation provided specifically that each political subdivisi9n 
of the state not belonging to a retirement plan could have'its employees covered 
by O.A.S.D.I., and authorized the State Department of Employment to enter into an 




Since this agreement was signed, O.A.S.D.I. coverage has been extended to 
almost 20,000 local government employees in Colorado including the following 
political subdivisions1 
62 counties 
1 city and county 
140 municipalities 
129 other local government districts 
17 judicial districts (employees other than judges). 
As a consequence of the 1954 Social Security Act Amendments, which extended 
coverage to public employees who are members of another retirement system, the 
Colorado General Assembly amended the state's enabling legislation to permit 
members of certain public employees' retirement systems to hold a referendum 
,for this _purpose. Such permission was given faculty members of institutions 
of higher learning covered by the Teachers ' Insurance Annuity Association (T.I.A.A.) 
and to employees of individual municipalities or subdivisions thereof having a 
separate and independent retirement system, except that policemen and firemen 
were excluded.2 · 
Under the provisions of this legislation the members of two separate retire• 
ment systems voted for O.A.S.D.I. coverage. Faculty members of the University of 
Colorado -- the only group covered by T.I.A.A. -- voted to coordinate or partially 
supplement their retirement coverage with O.A.S.D.I. Orginally, they had contributed 
at a rate of seven per cent to T.I.A.A.; when o.A.S.D.I. coverage was added the 
contribution rate to T.I.A.S. was reduced to five per cent. Employees of the 
Denver Water Board voted to add O.A.S.D.I. coverage and contribution to the coverage 
and contribution rate of their separate retirement plan. This method of combination 
is known as full supplementation. 
No provision was made by state legislation either in 1955 or later for a 
referendum to be held by members of P.E.R.A., nor did Colorado request inclusion 
as one of the states permitted to have two retirement systems as provided in the 
1. 111-7-1 through 8 CRS 1953 as amended by CS 1957 
2. 111-7-9 CS 1957 to CRS 1953. 
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1956, 1957, and 1958 amendments to the Social Security Act. It would necessitate 
further amendment to the state enabling legislation before P.E.R.A. members would 
be able to hold a referendum for O.A.S.D.I. coverage. If two separate retirement 
systems were desired, not onl;y would amendment to the state's enabling legislation 
be needed, but also a change in the federal act to add Colorado to the ~ist of 
states in which two systems are permitted. 
No addition or change in federal legislation would be needed to cover state 
and school temporary and part-time employees, who are not eligible for P.E.R.A., 
under O.A.S.D.I. but changes would have to be made in the state's enabling legis• 
lation. Temporary and part-time employees of the eight P.E.R.A. member municipalities 
might be covered under O.A.S.D.I. through a modification of the present agreement 
without further statutory change. 
Specific Provisions for Combining O.A.S.D.I. 
and Public Employee Retirement Systems· 
The 1954 amendment to Section 218 of the Social Security Act sets forth the 
procedure by which members of a public employee retirement system could combine 
their retirement plan with O.A.S.D.I •. In setting up these procedures, the amend~ 
ment states congressional policy in respect.to retirement ,for public employees. 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress ••• that the protection 
afforded employees in positions covered by a retirement system ••• will not be 
impaired as a result of making this agreement applicable or as a result of 
legislative enactment in anticipation thereof." 
The amendment specifies that the governor of .the state must certify to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that the following conditions have 
been met: 
1) a referendum by secret written ballot was held on the question of whether 
service in positions covered by such retirement system should be excluded fr9m or 
included under an agreement to, provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage. 
2). an opport~ty to vote in such referendum was given (and was limited) to 
eligible employees1 
3) not less than 90 days' notice of such referendum was given to all such 
employees; 
4) suGh referendum was conducted under the supervision of the governor, or 
an agency, or individual designated by himJ and 
5) a majority of the eligible employees voted in favor of including service 
in such positions under an agreement to provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage. 
The 1954 amendment also made it possible to divide a public employee's 
retirement system into separate groups for the purposJ of holding a referendum. 
Separate retirement systems could be set up for state employees, one or more 
political subdivisions, and for each institution of higher learning. 
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Under the provisions of the 1954 amendment, every member of a retirement 
system would be covered by O.A.S.D.I., if a majority of the members voted for 
such coverage. However, it would be possible to have state employees, employees 
of each institution of higher learning, school employees -- either as a group or 
by· school district, and employees of municipalities -- either as a group or by 
municipality•• vote separately on such coverage. 
These procedures still apply unless a state is designated as one of those· 
which may have two retirement systems. This provision, added to the Social Security 
Act in 1956, makes it possible for employees not wishing O.A.S.D.I. coverage to 
continue with their present retirement system. All employees who wish O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage combined with their retirement plan become .part of a new retirement 
system. All new employees are required to become p'art of the combined plan. 
For referendum purposes the same retirement system breakdown applies in 
this situation as it does for states not desiring dual retirement plans. In 
other words, it would be possible to have two state employee retirement systems, 
two or more school retirement systems, two or more municipal retirement systems, 
and two retirement systems for each institution of higher learning. 
Fourteen states and one territory are now enumerated as tho~e in which the 
retirement system(s) may be divided into two parts. Nine of these were listed 
in the 1956 amendment and the rest were added by the 1957 and 1958 amendments. 
These states and one territory include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota,_New York, North Da~ota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Hawaii. 
The 1958 amendment further liberalized O.A.S.D.I. coverage for public employees 
by providing that any employee who.originally chose to remain in the retirement 
plan which was not combined with O.A.S.D.I. can change later to the plan in which 
combination coverage is providedJ however, such change can be made no later than 
12-31-59. 
Back Dating of O.A.S.D.I. Coverage 
For the purposes of computing O.A.S.D.I. retirement benefits, a covered 
employee's salary is averaged from January 1, 1951, until the time of his retire-
ment. This average includes only that portion of annual salary upon which O.A.S.D.I. 
contributions were made. This means that an employee will receive a maximum. of 
$4,800 for any one ye~r and with no salary in years in which the employee made no 
contributions to O.A.S.D.I., however, the five lowest years may be dropped out in 
making the computations. 
This problem of no salary credits for years in which no contributions to 
O.A.S.D.I. have been made was taken into account in the provisions for combining 
O.A.S.D.I. with public employee retirement systems. It was recognized that man;y 
public employees covered by a retirement system probably would not have _O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage during the period from January 1, 1951, until the date when the System 
was combined with O.A.S.D.I. Since the five lowest years may be dropped out in 
computing O.A.S.D.I. retirement benefits, provision has been made to back date 
O.A.S.D.I. coverage to January 1, 1956, for public employees who choose to combine 
~- ~...their retirement systems with O.A.S.D.I. 
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In order to be eligible for the back dating provision, the a'greement for 
prov;i.ding O,A.S,D.I. coverage for members of public employees' retirement systems 
can be dated no later than December 31, 1959. In other words, unless such an 
agreement is signed within the specified time, maximum O,A.S.D.I, retirement 
benefits connnensurate with salary cannot be provided for members of a public 
employees' retirement system. While this time period was extended in 1957, 
Congress may show reluctance to extend it aey further. 
Methods of Combining O,A,S~D,I, With 
a Public Employees 17tetirement System 
There are three basic ways in which'. O.A.S.D.I. may be merged with a public 
employees• retirement system. 
l) Offset - The retirement plan is fused with O.A,S,D~I. so that present 
retirement plan benefits would be directly offset by socia1 security benefits, 
A complete merging of benefits and contributions is generally achieved, Conse-
quently, as O,.A.S.D.I. benefits and contribution rates increase, the retirement 
plan benefits .and contribution rates decrease in the same proportion. 
2) Supplementation - O.A.S.D.I, benefits are superimposed upon the present 
retirement system, with the present benefits to be maintained in full measure 
without change. The benefits and contribution rates of the present system are 
continued at the existing level with O.A,S.D.I. benefits and contributions added, 
3) Coordination - O,A,S,D,I. is combined with an adjusted retirement plan. 
The present retirement plan would be revised downward-with respect to benefits and 
contributions, although not necessarily in the same amount as O.A.S.D.I. benefits 
and contribution rates. Consequently, the total retirement benefits might be more 
than those presentzy provided by the retirement without combination with O,A.S.D.I,, 
but less than those which would be provided through full supplementation. Contribu-
tion rates, at least at the present, would usually be maintained at a level slightly 
higher than those for the retirement system prior to the O.A.S.D.I. adjustment. In 
the future, contribution rates·would increase as O,A.S.D.I~ rates increased, because 
there would be no further downward revision in the present retirement system, either 
in contribution rates or benefits. 
Freezing of Earned Credits 
In combining by either the offset or coordination methods, a decision must be 
made-as to whether cr~dits earned before merging with O,A.S.D.I. should be frozen. 
If these credits are frozen, employees would get full credit under the old retire-
ment.plan formula for all service rendered prior to the merging of the plan with 
O,A.S,D.I, Credits earned for service after the plans are combined would be 
computed according to the new formula and added to those frozen to compute the total 
retirement benefit. If credits already earned are not frozen, service under the old 
plan will be recomputed according to the new formula, so that service rendered both 
before and after combination with O.A.S.D.I. will be computed in the same way. 
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When earned credits are frozen it increases the cost of the retirement plan, 
because benefits are increased for those employees who had prior service credit. 
It also means that all present employees will retire with a higher benefit than 
those hired in the future, all of whose service credit would be computed according 
to the new formula. The freezing of credits, however, makes it unlikely that any 
member of the present retirement system would contest combination with O.A.S.D.I. 
because of :unpairment of benefits already earned. It also makes combination 
especially advantageous to older employees with considerable service under the old 
retirement plan. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
The chief advantage to an offset plan is its low cost. Its major disadvantage 
is that it ties the local retirement system very closely to O.A.S.D.I. Any adjust-
ment in o.A.S.D.I. must be reflected by an opposite adjustment in the local 
retirement sys1em. This has the effect of placing the responsibility for local 
retirement policy in Washington. Employees usually object to an offset plan, 
because it provides them with approximately the same benefits they had before 
combination with O.A.S.D.I. at a higher contribution rate. Arry further increase in 
- O,A,S.n.r. benefits do not result in higher benefits for employees under an offset 
plan, because the local retirement system benefits are reduced by the same amount. 
~ Full supplementation provides greatl._v increased benefits, but at a much higher 
) 
contribution rate. This rate will continue to increase as the O.A.S,D.I. contribu-
tion rate goes up. It is the most expensive method of combining with O.A.S.D.I. 
Maey employers oppose full supplementation, because of the greater cost. Employees 
look with favor upon the benefits, but also object to the high contribution rates. 
A coordinated plan is usually more expensive than offset, but less costly than 
full supplementation. It has the advantage of not being tied so closely to O.A.S.D.I. 
that local retirement policy is dictated by changes in O.A.S.D.I. It may offer 
benefits slightl.;y in excess of those under the local plan before combination. Any 
further increase in O.A.S.D.I.'benefits are realized by the employees, because local 
retirement benefits are not reduced. 
Thus far, it has been assumed that O.A.S,D.I. will be added in some way to the 
present retirement plan modified for such purpose. It is also possible to set up a 
completely new and separate retirement plan providing for combination with O.A.S,D.I. 
This method has certain advantages in that aey inadequacies or inequities of the 
present plan can be eliminated in the new one, and.the new plan can be actuarial:cy 
conceived to blend in with O.A.S,D.I. in the way desired, rather than merely grafted 
on to the existing plan. It would also eliminate the necessity of a vote of the 
employee members of the present plan to put it into operat'ion, and would avoid the 
imposition of O.A.S.D.I. benefits upon those who did not want them. 
If such a plan were considered, it would be necessary for the state to be 
included among those which may have two retirement systems under Section 218 or the 
Social Security Act. If this were done, all new employees would be required to 
become members of the new system. Old employees could switch over if they chose, 
but their prior service credits would be recomputed according to the new ]1711an 
formula. Only those employees who would gain more through O.A.S.D.I. coverage than 
they would lose through a recomputation of their credits would likely transfer to 
the new plan. 
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Combination With O.A.S.D.I. In Other States 
Thirty-three states have combined their retirement programs for state employees 
with o.A.S.D.I. Thirteen of these states have set up coordinated plans; 10 have 
provided for full supplementation; and the remainder have integrated plans providing 
for total or partial offset. Teacher retirement . plans in 27 states have been 
combined with O.A.S.D.I. Fifteen have full supplementation, seven have a coordinated 
plan, and five have some .form of integration. At least some local government 
employees in 30 states have their retirement plans combined with O.A.S.D.I. In 12 
states supplementation plans have been authorized, seven states have authorized 
coordinated systems, and three states have authorized offset plans. The remain9er 
have separate plans in which more than one method of combination has been used. 
Following is a breakdown of states according to the categories of employees 
covered under combined planst4 
State Employees, Local Government Employees and Teachers: Alabama, Indiana, 
Maryland, . Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New "York, 




State Employees and Teachers Only: Arizona, North Dakota, South Carolina and 
Wyoming. 
State Employees Only: Connecticut. 
/ 
1!.ocal Government Employees Only: Illinois, KentuckY,, Louisiana, and Mississippi. -~ 
3. 
Teachers Only: Idaho, Kansas, Missouri. 
O.A.S.D.I., The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
AFL-CIO, March 1, 1958 
Severa~ states also have combined coverage for university and college employees. 
These 1ncluder Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma Tennessee Te:xas 
Vermont, Washington and West Virginia ' ' ' 
III 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO COMBINE P.E.R.A. AND O.A.S.D.I. 
Without specific proposals to examine as to costs and benefits, it is 
impossible to determine satisfactorily whether it is desirable to combine 
P.E.~.A. and O.A.S.D.I. Three bills have been introduced in recent years 
in the General Asse~bly to permit referenda for the purpose of combining 
P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I., but these proposals were not evaluated acturia,lly 
as to costs and benefits prior to their introduction.1 
These bills failed to pass; further discussion of combination prior 
to this study by the Legislative Council Committee on Public Employees 
Retirement was limited to general pros and cons. Recognizing that a good 
case could be made both for and against combination d-epending on viewpoints 
and initial assumptions, the committee had several methods of combination 
actuarially evaluated to provide a factual basis for discussion. 2 
These proposals included: 
1) full supplementation, the most expensive method of combination; 
2) full offset, the least expensive method of combination; 
3) a coordinated plan in which P.E.R.A. benefits are reduced at age 
65, with the effect that the total benefit is slightly higher than under 
P.E.R.A. alone; and 
4) a new retirement plan based on 30 years of service and coordinated 
with O.A.S.D.I. 
In evaluating these proposals, the connnittee specified that no present 
employee should_ receive less under a combination plan tha,n pe would receive 
under p:.E.R.A. In all proposals except the new 30-year plan, present P.E.R.A. 
provisions for retirement prior to age 65 were continued, with adjustment 
for O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefits to be made at age 65. The request 
also was made' that the offset and coordinated plan be evaluated in two ways: 
first, without earned credits frozen; and second, with earned credits frozen. 
In all proposals, it was assumed that O.A.S.D.I. coverage for employees who 
are elrendy members of P.E.R.A. would be backdated to 1-1-56. 
1. H.B. 84 and H.B. 103, 40th General Assembly, 1st Session, 1955; S.B. 208, 
41st General Assembly, 1st Session, 1957. 
2. These actuarial evaluations were made by A. G. Gabriel, P.E.R.A. ·system 
actuary. The committee was assisted in preparing these proposals for 
evaluation by F. Leighton Exel, actuary, Coates, Herfurth & England. 
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Backdating would apply only to those present P.E.R.A. members who decide 
to join the combination plan. If the state did not have authorization to 
have a two-part retirement system, backd~ting of O.A.S.D.I. coverage would 
be necessary for all employees in the retirement system divisions in which 
a majority of employees voted for a combination plan. With a two-part 
retirement system, backdating would apply only to those present P.E.R.A. 
employees who decide to join the combination plan. New employees would have 
their O.A.S.D.I. coverage begin upon entrance into the combination plan, 
so backdating would .not apply. The cost of backdating, therefore, would be 
determined by the number of present P.E.R.A. members who chose coverage under 
the combined plan. If all present employees in the state division transferred 
to a combination plan, the cost of backdating the employer's share alone of . 
O.A.S.D.I. to 1-1-56 would be between three million and four million dollars. 
There are several possible ways in which the cost of backciating could 
be met. The necessary funds could be taken from both· the employers' and 
employees' contributions already made. If a two-part system were set up, 
however, it might not be legally possible to transfer employer contributions 
to the combined plan, although employee contributions could be transferred 
for those employees who choose a combined plan. Even if the transfer of 
employer contributions were possible for those employees who select the 
combined plan, it might not be advisable. As the executive secretary of 
P.E.R.A. points out, it might be better to leave these employer contributions 
in the P.E.R.A. portion of a two-part system to insure that there would be 
sufficient assets for those members who decide to remain in P.E.R.A. 
If only the employee contributions for those who choose the combined 
plan are transferred, it would be possible to use a portion to pay both the 
employees' and employers' share of backdating. The employees who transferred 
to the combined plan would then be credited for their payment of the employers' 
share which would ultimately be replaced through employer contributions. 
Another possible method of paying the employer's share of backdating would be 
through a general appropriation. However, this would prove expensive to 
many school districts and municipalities and as indicated above might cost 
the state between three and four million dollars. 
Basic Provisions of the Combination Plans 
Full Supplementation. This plan is similar to P.E.R.A. in every respect 
except that O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be added to P.E.R.A. benefits at age 
65. An employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive the same benefit 
he would have received under P.E.R.A. At age 65 he would continue to receive 
his P.E.R.A. benefit plus his O.A.S.D.I. benefit. Umer this proposal, an 
employee would be eligible for disability benefits and survivorship benefits 
urder both P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. 
Offset (earned credits not frozen). 'lhis plan is generally similar to 
P.E.R.A. with three exceptions: 1) O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits are 
subtracted from P.E.R.A. benefits; 2) O.A.S.D.I. disability benefits are 
added to P.E.R.A. disability benefits; and 3) benefits would be the same 
as P.E.R.A. for retirement before age 65. At age 65, P.E.R.A. benefits 
would be reduced by the amount of the O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit. 
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Eligibility for the O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit would have no effect on the 
amount of the P.E.R.A. benefit to be received at age 65. In the instance 
that an employee has not worked five years under P.E.R.A. at the time of his 
retirement, he would receive his O.A.S.D.I. benefit in addition to the 
actuarial equivalent of his contributions to P.E.R.A. In other words, he 
would receive a P.E.R.A. benefit equal to the value of his contribution plus 
interest i:n addition to his O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. As credits already 
earned are not frozen, prior service would be recomputed according to the 
new formula at age 65. 
Offset (earned credits frozen). This plan is the same as the offset 
plan above except that credits already earned would be frozen. The new formula 
would apply only to service after the date the plan goes into effect. For 
example, an employee with 10 years prior service who retired with 20 years 
service at age 65 would recieve a benefit equal to one-half the P.E.R.A. 
benefit (first 10 years, earned credits frozen) plus the actuarial equivalent 
of the second 10 years P.E.R.A. contributions plus O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance 
benefit. If the total of the three were less than the normal P.E.R.A. benefit 
for similar service, his P.E~R.A. benefit would be increased in the amount 
needed to equal the normal P.E.R.A. benefit when added to the O.A.S.D.I. 
primary benefit. The O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be in 
addition. 
Coordination (earned credits not frozen). This plan is also similar 
to P.E.R.A. except that O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits are substituted for 
P.E.R.A. survivorship benefits. Disability benefits would be provided by 
both plans. Retirement benefits prior to age 65 are computed in the same 
way as P.E.R.A. at present. At age 65, P.E.R.A. benefits would be computed 
according to the following formula; one per cent of the first $4,800 of final 
coverage salary times the number of years of service not to exceed 20 plus 
2.5 per cent of the amount of final average salary above $4,800 times the 
years of service not to exceed 20 plus the O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance 
benefit. The O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional. 
As earned credits are not frozen, prior service would be recomputed at age 
65 according to the above formula. In no instance, however, would the combined 
P.E.R.A. - O.A.S.D.I. total be less than the :amount which ,rnuld have been 
received under the regular P.E.R.A. formula. 
Coordination (earned credits frozen). '!his plan is the same as 
coordination above except that credits already received under P.E.R.A. would 
be frozen and would not be computed according to the new formula at age 65. 
The new formula would apply only to future service. For example, an emplo1ee 
with 20 years service at age 65, 10 of which were prior to the initial dafe 
of the combined plan would receive an annuity according to the following formula: 
one-half P.E.R.A. benefit (10 years prior service) plus one per cent of final 
avera~e salary below $4,800 times 10 years service plus 2.5 per cent of final 
average salary (if any) above $4,800 times 10 years service plus O.A.S.D.I. 
primary annuity, with the O.A. S.D.I. spouse's benefit if payable, in addition. 
New Retirement Plan. The new retirement plan is based on a career concept 
of 30 years service and retirement at age 65. The benefit formula was 
devised to blend in with the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. Retirement benefits 
are computed according to the following formula at age 65: .67 per cent of 
the first $4,800 of final average salary times years of service, with no 
limit plus 1.67 per cent of final average salary above $4,800 times years of 
service, with no limit plus O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. The O.A.S.D.I. 
spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional. Retirement before age 
65 is possible, but ~ould be discouraged through the provision that the 
annuity paid for early retirement would be the actuarial equivalent of the 
same annui'ty at age 65. For example, an employee retiring at age 60 would 
receive the same total annuity (except for O.A.S.D.I.) that he would receive 
at age 65, except that it would be apportioned over his longer life 
expectancy. 'Ihe monthly benefit he would receive would be approximately 
two-thirds of what he would have received for the same amount of service 
at age 65. If he retired at age 55 with 30 years service, his monthly 
annuity would be approximately 47 per cent of what he would have received 
for the same a11X>unt of service at age 65. 
Other benefits of the new retirement plan would be similar to P.E.R.A. 
except that O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits would be substituted for 
similar benefits under P.E.R.A. 
Deferred annuities as provided in P.E.R.A. are incorporated in all of 
the combination proposals except that they would be computed according to 
each plan's formula at age 65. Members who leave covered service and are 
not eligible for a deferred annuity or who do not choose to avail themselves 
of such benefits would be entitled to refunds of all contributions except 
for those made of O.A.S.D.I'. Except for the new retirement plan, these 
refunds would be made without interest, the same as the present P.E.R.A. 
provision. The new retirement plan provides for refunds at the interest 
rate assumed for the system -- in this instance, 2.5 per cent. 
Contribution Rates, Costs and Benefits 
The contribution rates and costs for all of the combined plans will 
be higher than P.E.R.A., eventually, if not at present. 'Ihe scheduled rate 
increases for O.A.S.D.I. will increase the contribution rates, over existing 
rates for all plans, including the offset plans. Employee contribution 
rates and benefits under each plan are the same for the state, school, and 
municipal divisions. Employer contribution rates for each plan vary somewhat 
from division to division. Employer contribution rates were computed 
with two different assumptions: 1) that only the interest on the unfunded 
liability would be financed annually; and 2) that the unfunded liability 
would be amortized over a 35 year period. 
Table III shows the state division contribution rate comparison for 
both employer and employees· for P.E.R.A. and the selected combination plans. 
The years 1959 and 1969 are used in the comparison to show: 1) the initia1 
contribution rate for each plan; and 2) the contribution rate for each plan 
when O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates reach the scheduled maximum of 4.5 per 
cent. Employer contributions shown in Table III include the contribution 






Employee and Employer Contribution Rates,a P.E.R.A. 
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. 
1959 and 1969 
1. P.E.R.A. 




3. Offset Totalf 
4. Offset (E.C.F.)d Totalf 

















6. Coordination (E.c.r.td 
Total 5.00% 6.90% ----------











7 .so% 7 .41%8 
a. Employer rates based on financing the interest only on unfunded accrued 
liabilities. 
b. Employee rates shown for combined plans apply to first $4,800 of salary. 
Contribution rate of 6 per cent 011 salary above $4 ,BOO for all combined 
plans. 
c. Employer O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates are weighted per cents of full 
payroll based on June 30 1 1958 payroll. 
d. E.C.F. - earned credits frozen. 
e. These rates are approximations only; actual rates will be based on the 
number of present employees who transfer to the new plan. The assumption 
is made that the employer would also contribute at the same rate for 
those employees who remain under P.E.R.A. While a portion of the 
contribution rate would apply to O.A.S.D.I. under the new plan, the total 
rate would apply to P.E.R.A. 
f. Including O.A.S.D.I. 
The offset combination (as was discussed above) presents the least expensive 
method of combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. and full supplementation represents 
the most expensive. In 1959, the two coordinated plans and the new retirement 
plan have the lowest contribution rates for employees. As O.A.S.D.I. 
contributions increase so do the employee contribution rates, so that they 
will be one per cent higher on the first $4,800 in 1969 and in the years 
following than either of the offset plans or P.E.R.A. 
Employee rates for the offset plan stay at six per cent, because increases 
in O .A. S.D.I. contributions are reflected in a proportionate decrease in 
contributions to P.E.R.A. Since O.A.S.D.I. rates are added to P.E.R.A • 
. untler full supplementation, the employee would begin by contributing 8.5 
per cent, and his contributions would increase to 10.5 per cent in 1969. 
Employer contribution rates are lowest in 1959 for the offset plan, 
without earned credits frozen; 1.45 per cent less than the current rate 
for P.E.R.A. In 1969, this rate would increase to 7.34 per cent or .64 per 
cent more than the current P.E.R.A. rate. The cost effect of freezing 
credits can be seen in the comparison between the two· offset plans and 
between the two coordinated plans. In 1959, the employer would have to 
contribute .88 per cent more' if earned credits were frozen under the offset 
plan, and .6 per cent more if earned credits were frozen under the coordinated 
plan. This increase also obtains to 1969 and the years following. 
The employer's contribution rate for the new retirement plan is 
approximated at 1.08 per cent less than P .E.R.A. in 1959, but • 71 per 
cent higher in 1969. 
The comparison of contribution rates for school and municipal division 
employers is shown in Table IV. Employee contributions remain the same 
for all three divisions am are as shown for state employees in Table III. 
The same variations which were shown in the state division's employer 
contributions also appear in the rates for school and municipal employers, 
although the rates are somewhat different. 
The contribution rates for the school and municipal divisions include 
the rate necessary to mee't the interest payments on the accrued unfumed 
liability. The contribution rates for the municipal division include the 
rate, necessary to amortize the unfumed accrued liability over a period 





Employer Contribution Rates, School and Municipal Divisions, P.E.R.A. 
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.a 
1959 and 1969 
1. P.E.R.A. 
2. Full Supplementation 
P .E .R .A. 
O.A.S.D.I. 
Total 
3. Offset Totale 
4. Offset (E.C.F.)C Totale 
6. Coordination Tota18 
6. Coordination (E.C.F.)C 
Tota18 



































a. Employer O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates are weighted per cents of full 
payroll based on June 30, 195B payrolls. 
b. Employer rates based on financing the interest only on unfunded accrued 
liability. 
c. E.C.F. - earned credits frozen. 
d. These rates are approximations only; actual rates will be based on the 
number of present employees who transfer to the new plan. The assumption 
is made that the employer would also contribute at the same rate for those 
employees who remain under P.E.R.A. While a portion of the contribution 
rate would apply to O.A.S.D.I. under the new plan, the total rate would 
apply to P.E.R.A. 
e. Including O.A.S.D.I. 
The employer contribution rates for the state and school divisions would 
be considerably higher if the accrued unfunded liability were amortized over 
a 35-year period. Once the unfunded liability is amortized, however, assuming 
no further increase, there would be a sizeable decrease in employer contribution 
rates. Table V shows the employer contribution rate comparisons between 
P.E.R.A. and the combination plans for the state and school division if the 
.accrued unfunded liability is amortized over a 35 year period. 
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Table V 
Employer Contribution Rate$, State, School Divisions, 
Accrued Unfunded Liability Amortized Over 35 Year Period, P.E.R.A. 
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. 







1. P.E.R.A. Totalc 7.98% 6.99% 7.98% 6.99% 4.94% 5.87% 
2. Full Supplementation 
Totalc 10.51% 9.67% 12.30% 11.59% 8.97% 10.19% 
a. Offset Totalc 5.58% 4.48% 7.81% 7 .10% · 6.69 7.09% 
4. Offset (E~C.F.)8 
Totalc 7.07% 5.41% 9.30% 7.63% 6.74% 7.13% 
s.· Coordination Totalc 7.10% 6.12% 8.89% 8.04% 6.98% 7.74% 
6. Coordination (E.C.F.)a 
TotalC 8.07% 6.84% 9.86% 8.76% 7.08% 7.80% 
7. New Retirement Planb 
Totalc 6.92% 5.53% 8.71% 7.45% 5.62% 6.08% 
a. E.C.F. - earned credits frozen. 
b. Costs are approximate. 
c. Including O.A.S,D.I. 
If the unfunded accrued liability is amortized over a 35-year period instead 
of financing the interest annually state employer contribution rates would be 
from .47 per cent (offset) to 1.4 per cent (full supplementation) higher in both 
1959 and 1969. If the unfunded liability is retired in 1994, state employer 
contribution rate decreases would range from .65 per cent (offset) to 1.93 per 
cent (full supplementation). 
Comparative figures for the school division show a contribution increase 
·· range from .13 per cent (coordination) to .59 per cent (full supplementation). 
There would be no rate increase for amortizing the unfunded liability under the 
offset plan with no earned credit frozen. 
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Municipal employer contribution rates amortizing the accrued unfunded 
liability over a 35-year period are shown below. Along with the rate reduction 
in 1994: 
1969 1969 1994 
P.E.R.A. 5.55% 5.55~ 6.03% 
Fu11 Supplementa·tion 8.18 10.07 9.27 
0ff1tet 4.24 e.5a 6.53 
Offset . 
(earned credits frozen) 4.41 6.70 6.56 
Coordination 4.95 6.84 6.84 
Coordination 
(earned credits frozen) 5.28 7 .17 6.90 
New Retirement Plan 4.29 6.18 5.52 
Retirement Annuitl Benefits 
The ' retirement annuities which would be received under the various 
combined plans are compared in Table VI for employees with 20 years of 
service or more at aRe 65. These annuities are shown for employees with 
different final average sala~ies, ranging from $250 to $600 .per month. 
The O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit is based upon avera~e salary 
durin~ the period contributions were made to O.A.S.D.I. This average 
was computed according to actuarial tables.a The spouse's benefit, if 
payable, would be in addition to the totals shown in the table. 
3. Actuarial Valuation Members and Annuitants o • cit. p. S4J the 
o .A .s.D •• summary ennui ty for sc_hool d~v1s1on employees would .be . 
slightly higher than the amount~ shown 1n Table VI because of a higher 
average career salary at each final average salary than state and 
municipal employees. 
Table VI 
Annuity Benefit Co111parison, P.E.R.A. and Selected Combination Plans 
Employees with 20, 25 1 30 1 and 35 Years Service at Age 65 ' 
Exclusive of Spouse's. Benefit 
$250M $300M $350 
Retirement l'lan P,E,R,A, o.A,S,D.I, Total 
Primary 
P,E.R,A, o.A,S,D,I, Total 
Primary 
P,E.l!.,A, O,A,S.,D.I, Total 
Primary 
1, P,E.R,A, (Present Plan) 
2, Full Supplementation 
3, Offset 
4. Offset (E,C,F,)8 






6, Coordination (E,C,F,)a 












































































































































































Retirement Plan P.E,R.A, o::t:"S".D.I, Total P.E,R,A. o":'i\3,D,I, Total 
Primary Primary 
P,E,R,A, ~.D.I. Total 
Primary 
1~ P.E.R,A, (Present Plan) S200 
2, Full Supplementation 
3, Offset 
·4, Offset (E,C.F.)a 






8. Coor~ination (E.C.F.) 8 







































































































































b) Would be applicable to all employees hired in 1959 or later and to those present P,E,R.A. 
members who wished to come into the new plan, All other P.E,k.A, -mbers could remain 







































Several items in Table VI are worthy of note: 
1. For all plans except the new retirement plan, maximum benefits are 
received with 20 years service at age 65. 
2. The plan which provides the largest annuity is full supplementation. 
This plan is also the most costly. However, if earned credits are frozen, 
employees with 20 years prior service would receive approximately the same 
amount urxter offset, coordination, and full supplementation. 
3. Under both offset and coordirotion with earned credits frozen, 
employees with five or more years of prior service will receive larger 
annuities than under P.E.R.A. This explains why the offset and coordination 
plans with earned credits frozen are more expensive than the same plans 
without this provision. 
4. The new retirement plan provides benefits equal to P.E.R.A. for 
20 years service at ap:e 65 only for those employees with a final average 
salary of $250 per month. With 25 years service, benefits are similar 
or ·slightly more than P.E.R.A. for employees with a final average salary 
of $350 per month or less. With 30 years af service or more, benefits 
under this new retirement plan exceed those under P.E.R.A. for all employees 
with .final average salaries shown in the table. 
5. Under both coordinated plans and the new retirement plan, the 
employees with less than $400 per month final average salary benefit the 
most in comparison with P.E.R.A. 1his relationship results from the 
$4,800 limit on O.A.S.D.I., arxi the fact that O.A.S.D.I. is weighted toward 
providing benefits for employees with lower incomes. 
Age 65, Five and Ten Years' Service. O.A.S.D.I. combination plans 
would be especially advantageous for those employees who reach their 65th 
birthday with 10 years' service or less. Under P.E.R.A., the employees 
with five years' service at age 65 are entitled to an annuity equal to 
one-eighth of final average salary. With 10 years' service at age 65, 
they are entltled to an annuity equal to one-fourth of final average 
salary. Tabies VII and VIII show comparative benefits for P.E.R.A. and 
the various combined plans for employees with five and ten year's service 
at age 65. 
The O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefits shown in these tables are 
based on the assumption that O.A.S.D.I. coverage began during the period 
these employees worked for the state and that such coverage for present 
employees was backdated to January 1, 1956. Therefore, the primary insurance 
benefit is the maximum that would be possible for the final average 
salaries shown in the two tables. For those employees who had O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage prior to entering state service, the amount of the primary insurance 
benefit would be less if their average salaries throughout their O .A .s.n .I. 
coverage were less than the final average salaries shown in the table. 
Even if this were the case, annuity benefits would be considerably greater 
than under P .E. R.A • 
The P.E.N.A. benefits shown under the offset plans are the actuarial 
equivalents of employees' contributions plus interest. 0.A.S.D.I. spouses' 
benefits, if payable, would be in addition to th~ totals shown in Tables 
VII and VIII on pages 45 and 46. 
Retirement, Prior to age ss·. Annuity benefits for retirement at age 
60 with 20 years service 1-rnuld be the same for P.E.R.-A. and all combination 
plans except the new retirement plan. All of the combined plans except the 
new retirement plan provide for retirement prior to age 65 in the same way 
that P.E.R.A. does at present. The formulae for computing benefits under 
these combination plans do not go into effect until annuitants reach age 65. 
The new retirement plan provides an annuity for retirement before age 65 
which is the actuarial equivalent of the same annuity at. ag~ 65. In other 
words, an employee who retires with 20 years' service at age·6o would receive 
an annuity of about two-thirds as much monthly as he would have received · 
had he retired with the same number of years of service at age 65. 
The above remarks also apply to employees who retire at age 55 with 
30 years service. All of the combination plans, except the new retirement 
plan, are similar to P.E.R.A. Under the new retirement plan, an employee 
who retires at age 55 with 30 years' service would receive an annuity which 
is equal to about 47 per cent per month of the one he would have received 
for 30 years service at age 65. 
The benefit comparison for P.E.R.A. and the various combination 
plans for retirement prior to age 65 are shown in Tables IX and X on 
page.47. 
Under all plans except P.E.R.A., the annuity benefits will change at 
65 for all employees who retired prior to reaching this age. Benefits are 
recomputed to allow for combination with 0.A.S.D.I. and the amount of the 
0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit. The amount of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary 
benefit will depend on the average wage received during the period covered 
by 0 .A .S.D .I. An employee who retires prior to age 65 and does not work in 
O.A.S.D.I. covered employment after such retirement will receive a lower 
0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit, because the uncovered years will 
reduce his average salary upon which 0.A.S.D.I. benefits are based. 
Under full supplementation, 0.A.S.D.I. benefits 'at age 65 would be 
added to the P.E.R.A. annuity established at the time of early retirement. 
Under the offset plan, the P.E.R.A. annuity received before age 65 will be 
reduced by the amount of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit. This 
plan is the only one under which an employee would not be penalized if he 
failed to work in 0.A.S.D.I. covered employment after early retirement 
under P.E.R.A. The P.E.R.A. annuity would be reduced only by the amount 
of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, so the total benefit would remain the 
same. Under the new retirement plan, the 0.A.S.D.I. primary benefit would 
'be added to the annuity received prior to age 65. 
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Table VII 
Annuity Benefit Comparison, P,E.R,A, 
and Selected Combi~ation Plans, 
Emplovees with Five Years' Service at Age 65 
Exclusive of Spoua•'• Ben•fi~ 
$250M $300M $350M 
Retirement Plan P.E,R,A, O.A.S,D,I, Total P,E,R,A, O·.A,S,D,I, Total P.E,lt,A, o.A.s.D.I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1, P,E.R,A, (Present Plan) $ 31 $ 31 $ 38 $ 38 $. 44 $ 44 
2, Full Supplementation $ 31 $ 95 $126 $ 38 $105 $143 $ 44 $116 $160 
3, Offset $ 4 $ 95 $ 99 $ 5 $105 $110 $ 5 $116 $121 
4, Offset (E,C,F,) 11 
Prior Servicer 5 years $ 31 $ 95 $126 $ 38 $105 $143 $ 44 $116 $160 
5. Coordination $ 13 $ 95 $108 $ 15 $105 $120 $ 18 $116 $134 
6, Coordination (E.C.F.)11 
Prior Service1 5 years $ 31 $ 95 $126 $ 38 $105 $143 $ 44 $116 $160 
7, New Retirement Plan $ 8 $ 95 $103 $ 10 $105 $115 $ 12 $116 $128 
$400M $500M $600M 
Retirement Plan P.E,R.,A, o.1'3.D . I. Total P.E.R.A, ~.D,I, Total P.E.R.A, o.A3.D,I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1. P,E,R,A, (Present Plan) $ 50 $ 50 $ 63 $ 63 $ 75 $ 75 
2. Full Supplementation $ 50 $127 $177 $ 63 $127 $190 $ 75 $127 $202 
,., 
a. Offset $ 6 $127 $133 $ 9 $127 $136 $ 12 $127 $139 -· 4, Offset (F..C.F.) 8 
,.. Prior Service: 5 years $ 50 $127 $177 $ 63 $127 $190 $ 75 $127 $202 
5, Coordination $ 20 $127 $147 $ 33 $127 $160 $ 45 $127 $172 
6, Coordination (E,C.F.)8 
> Prior Service: 5 years $ 50 $127 $177 $ 63 $127 $190 $ 75 $127 $202 
7, New Retirement Plan $ 13 $127 $140 $ 22 $127 $149 $ 30 $127 $157 
a) E.C.F. - earned credits frozen. 
Table VIII 
Anmiity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A. and Selected Combination Plans, 
Employees lii th 10 Years' Service at Age 65 
Exclusive of Spouse's Banefi t 
$250M ~ $356K Retirement Pl.an P.E.R.A, ~.D.I. Total P.E.R,A, •• ,D.I. Total P.E.R.A. 0:-X:S.D.I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1. P.E.R,A. (present plan) $ 63 $ 63 $ 75 $ 75 $ 88 $ 88 
2. Full Supplementation $ 63 $ 95 $158 $ 75 $105 $180 $ 88 $116 $204 
3. Offset $ 7 $ 95 $102 $ 8 $105 $113 $ 10 $116 $126 
4, Offset (E,C,F.)a 
Prior ·services None $ '7 $ 95 $102 $ 8 $106 $113 $ 10 $116 $126 
6 years $ 36 $ 95 $130 $ 42 $105 $147 $ 49 $116 $165 
5. Coordination $ 26 $ 96 $120 $ 30 $105 $136 $ 35 $116 $151 
6. Coordination (E.C,F.)8 
Prior Service: None $ 25 $ 95 $120 $ 30 $105 $135 $ 35 $116 $151 
6 years $ 44 $ 95 $139 $ 52 $105 $157 $ 61 $116 $177 
7. New Retirement Pil.an 
Future Service: 
10 years $ 17 $ 95 $112 $ 20 $105 $125 $ 23 $116 $139 
$400K $SOOK $600M 
Retireaant Plan P.E,R,A. O,A,S.D.I, Total P.E,R,A, O.A,S,D,I, Total P.E.R.A. O.A.S.D, I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1, P.E,R.A, (Present Plan) $100 $100 $125 $125 $150 $150 
2, Full Supplementation $100 $127 $227 $125 $127 $252 $150 $127 - $277 
3, Offset $ ll $127 $138 $ 17 $127 $144 $ 22 $127 $149 
,4. Offset (E,C,F,)a 
Prior Service: None $ 11 $127 $138 f 17 $127 $144 $ 22 $127 $149 5 years $ 56 $127 $183 71 $127 $198 $ 87 $127 $214 
5, Coordination $ 40 $127 $167 $ 65 $127 $192 $ 90 $127 $217 
6, Coordi111tion (E,C.F ,)• 
Prior Service: None $ 40 $127 $167 $ 65 $127 $192 $ 90 $127 $217 
6 years $ 70 $127 $197 $ 95 $127 $212 $120 $127 $247 
7, New Retirement Plan 
Future Service: 
10 years $27 $127 $154 $ 43 $127 ' $170 $ 60 $127 $187 
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Table ll 
Annuity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A. 
and Selected Combination Plans, 
Employees with 20 Years' Service at Age 60 














Annuity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A. 
and Selected Combination Plans, 
Employees with 30 Years' Service at Age 55 
.. 
. .... . ~: .... 
$250 $300 $350 
Month Month Month 
P.E.R.A. and All Other Plans Except $125 $150 $175 


























For em loyees who retired rior to a ,e 65 the annuity amount e1.t a·ge 
65 wou d be equal to or higher than the present P.E.R.A. annuity under all 
combination plans except the new retirement plan. Those employees with 
prior service would benefit considerably from either the offset or 
coordin~ted plans with earned credits frozen, except that employees with 
20 years prior service at age 60 or 30 years prior service at age 55 would 
not be able to retire and receive an O.A.S.D.I. annuity unless they worked 
elsewhere· in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment between the time of retirement 
and age 65. Witho~t this additional covered employment they would not 
have a sufficient number of O.A.S.D.I. covered quarters. Tables XI and 
XII show the annuity benefits at age 65 for employees who retired at age 
60 with 20 years service and for those who retired at a~~ 55 with 30 years 
service, see pages .49 and 50. The O.A.S.D.I. primary benefits shown in 
these tables are based on the assu~ption that employees who retire before 
65 will not work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment. If such employees 
should work in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment between retirement and age 65, 
the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefits would be larger. Spouses' benefits, if 
payable, are in addition to the totals shown in these tables. 
P.E.R.A. and Combination Plans: Some Considerations 
No clear-cut case can be imde for: combining or not combining P.E.R.A. 
and O.A.S.D.I. There are general advantages which should be considered, as 
well as good points and drawbacks to each of the proposed combination 
plans. Employers and employees may look at these from different points 
of view. Combination may or m?.y not be desirable for a specific employee, 
depending on his age, years of service, marital status, salary, sex, and 
career aspirations. 
In general, a combined plan will not be looked upon too favorably 
by employees who plan to retire before ar,e 65, especially those who plan to 
work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment. Employees in the higher 
salary brackets and women whose husbands are working in O.A.S.D.I. covered 
employment also may see 1i ttle desir?bili ty in a combination plan. 
Combination with O.A.S.D.I. would be most advantageous to older 
employees nearing age 65, married male employees who expect to qualify for 
the spouse's benefit, older employees who begin their state or local 
government service after a number of years of O.A.S.D.I. coverage, younger 
workers who are still more or less transient, and employees in the lower 
salary brackets. 
Originally, survivorship benefits and continuity of retirement coverage 
for non-career employees were among the reasons that combil'lc'tion of O.A.S.D.I. 
and P.E.R.A. was advocated. The addition of survivorship benefits to 
P.E.R.A. has given O.A.S.D.I. little advantage in this respect. The addition 
of deferred annuities to P .E .R.A. minimizes the need of r_etirement coverage 
for transient employees, although the value of deferred annuities is 
questionable for younger employees with families, who may not be able to 
afford deferring a return on their contributions until age 65. Combination 
with O.A.S.D.I. is also looked upon favorably because of the spouse's benefit. 
Table XI 
A111111ity . Benefit Comparisona at A~e 65, P. E.R.A. and Selected Combination Plana, 
EmployeP.S who Retired at Age 60 with 20 Years' Service 
Exclusive of Spouse's Benefit ffl .. . $300M $350M 
letirement Plan P,E.R,A, ••• D,I, Total P,E.R.A, o.A.S,D.I. Total P.E,R.A, 0.A,S.D,I. Total i 
Primacy Primary Primary 
1. P.E,R,A. (Present Plan) $125 $125 $150 $150 $175 $175 
2. Full Supplementation $125 $ 82 $207 $150 $ 90 $240 $175 $ 98 $273 
3. Offset $ 43 $ 82 $125 $ 60 $ 90 $150 $ 77 $ 98 $175 
4, Offset (E.C,F,)8 
Prior Service: None $ 43 $ 82 $125 $ 60 $ 90 $150 $ 77 $ 98 $175 
5 years $ 44 $ 81 $125 $ 60 $ 90 $150 $ 77 $ 98 $175 
10 years . $ 68 $ 79 $147 $ 82 $ 87 $169 $ 95 $ 94 $189 
15 years $ 97 $ 74 $171 $116 $ 80 $196 $135 $ 87 $222 
5, Coordination $ 50 $ 82 $132 $ 60 $ 90 $160 $ 70 $ 98 $168 
6, Coordination (E,C.F.)8 
Prior Service: None $ 50 $ 82 $132 $ 60 $ 90 $150 $ 70 $ 98 $168 
5 years $ 68 $ 82 $150 $ 83 $ 90 $173 $ 97 $ 98 $195 
10 years $ 87 $ 82 $169 $105 $ 90 $195 $122 $ 98 $220 
15 years $106 $ 82 $188 $128 $ 90 $218 $149 $ 98 $247 
7. New Retirement Plan $ 22 $ 82 $104 $ 27 $ 90 $117 $ 31 $ 98 $129 
-400M ffl m Jletirement Plan 1' .• E,R.A. 1o.T.'s.D • I. Total P.E,R.A. ••• D.I. Total P,E,R,A, • .D, I, Total 
Prh1ary Primary Primary 
~ 1. P ,E .R .~. (Present Plan) 1$200 $200 $250 $260 $300 $300 
2. Full Supplementation $200 '$107 $307 $250 $110 $360 $300 $110 $410 
A 
3. Offset 1.$ 93 $107 $200 $140 $110 $250 $190 $110 $~00 
4. Offset (E,c.r.)• 
Prior Service: None $ 93 $107 $200 $140 $110 $250 $190 $110 $300 
.... 5 years $ 94 $106 $200 $142 '$108 $250 $192 $108 $300 10 years $109 $102 $211 $147 $103 $250 $197 $103 $300 
15 years $155 $ 93 $248 $194 $ 94 $Z88 $234 $ 94 $328 
5, Coordination $ 80 $1C17 $187 $130 $110 $240 $180 $110 $290 
6, Coordination (E,C.F.)a 
Prior Servicd: None $ 80 $107 $187 $130 $110 $240 $180 $110 $290 
5 years $110 $107 $217 $160 $110 $270 $210 $110 $320 
10 years $140 $107 $247 $190 $110 $300 $240 · $110 $350 
15 years $170· $107 $277 $222 $110 $332 $270 $110 $380 
7. New Retir11111ent Plan $ 35 $107 $142 $ 57 $110 $167 $ 80 $110 $190 
a) E.C,F. • earned credits frozen • 
.,. 
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Table XII 
Annuity Benefit Comparisons at Age 65, P.E.R.A. 
and Selected Combination Plans, 
Employees ¥.ho Retire at A~e 55 with 30 Years' Service 
Exclusive of Spouse's Benefit 
$250M $300M $350H 
ietire111ent Plan P.E.R.A. O.A.S.D.I. Total P.E.R.A. 'o":A.s. D • I. Total P.E,R.A, 0.A.S.D.I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1. P.E.R.A, (Present Plan) $125 $125 $150 $150 $175 $175 
2, Full Supplementation $125 $ 78 $203 $150 $ 05 $235 $175 $ 92 $267 
3. Offset $ 47 $ 78 $125 $ 65 $ 85 $150 $ 83 $ 92 $175 
4. Offset (E.C.F.)B 
Prior Service: None $ 47 $ 78 $125 $ 65 $ 85 $150 $ 83 $ 92 $175 
5 years $ 48 $ 77 $125 $ 66 $ 84 $150 $ 83 $ 92 $175 
10 years $ 50 $ 75 $125 $ 68 $ 82 $150 $ 86 $ 89 $175 
15 years $ 68 $ 73 $141 $ 81 $ 80 $161 $ 95 $ 86 $181 
20 years $ 87 · $ 69 $156 $104 $ 76 $180 $121 $ 81 $202 
5, Coordination $ 50 $ 78 $128 $ 60 $ 85 $145 $ 70 $ 92 $162 
6. Coordination (E.C.F.)a 
Prior Servicll: None $ 50 $ 78 $128 $ 60 $ 85 $145 $ 70 $ 92 $162 
5 years $ 71 $ 77 $148 $ 85 $ 84 $169 $ 99 $ 92 $191 
10 years $ 92 $ 75 $167 $110 $ 82 $192 $128 $ 89 $217 
15 years $100 $ 73 $173 $120 $ 80 $200 $140 $ 86 $226 
20 years $108 $ 69 $177 $130 $ 76 $206 $152 $ 81 $233 
7, Ne'll' Retirement Plan $ 23 $ 78 $101 $ 28 $ 85 $113 $ 33 $ 92 $125 
$$400M $SOOK $600M 
Retirement Plan P,E,R,.A. O.A.S.D,I. Total P.E.R.A, o.A.S,D.I. Total P.E.R.A, o.A.S.D.I. Total 
Primary Primary Primary 
1. P.E.R.A. (Present Plan) $200 $200 $250 $250 $300 $300 
2. Full Supplementation $200 $100 $300 $250 $105 $355 $300 $105 $405 
3. Offset $100 $100 $200 $145 $105 $250 $195 $105 $3PO 
Offset (E.C .F. )8 
$100 $100 $200 $145 $105 $250 $195 $105 $300 Prior Service 1 None 
5 years $101 l 99 $200 1146 $104 $250 $196 $104 $300 
10 years $104 96 $200 149 $101 $250 $199 $101 $300 
15 years $108 $ 92 1200 $154 . $ 96 $250 $204 $ 96 $300 
20 years $138 $ 87 225 $174 $ 90 $264 $212 $ 90 $302 
5. Coordination $ 80 $100 $180 $130 $105 $235 $180 $105 $285 
· 6, Coordination (E.C.F.)8 
$ 80 $100 $180 $130 $105 $235 $180 $105 $285 Prior Service: None 
5 years $113 $ 99 $212 $172 $104 $196 $230 $104 $334 
10 years $147 $ 96 $243 $213 $101 $314 $200 $101 $381 
15 years $160 $ 92 $252 $222 $ 96 $318 $285 $ 96 $381 
20 years $173 $ 87 $260 $232 $ 90 $322 $290 $ 90 $380 
New Retirement Plan $ 37 $100 $137 $ 61 $105 $166 $. 84 $105 $189 
a) E.C.F, - earned credits f~ozen, 
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O.A.S.D.I. is designed to provide minimum retirement standards. Other 
retirement systems usually are designed to attract career employees whose 
fin~l average salaries are considered a measure of their worth and upon 
which retirement benefits are usually based. It is ~rgued that a combination 
of the two provides both minimum and maximum retirement limits. Some proponents 
of combination plans agree that all employees probably will be covered by 
O.A.S.D.I. eventuall;y, so that Colorado should take -this step for its public 
employees now at the most advantageous time, while coverage may be back-
dated to January 1, 1956, which would insure present employees no loss in 
O.A.S.D.I. benefits. 
On the other hand, it is pointed out that all combination plans are 
more costly than P.E.R.A. Some of the present P.E.R.A. provisions are 
either incompatible with O.A.S.D.I. or a duplication of benefits. Retirement 
before 65 and deferred annuities do not blend in too well with O.A.S.D.I. 
P.E.R.A. also provides survivorship benefits similar to O.A.S.D.I., as 
well as superior disability benefits. 
Perhaps the best way to determine whether combination is desirable . . 
is to examine the advantages and disadvantages of P.E.R.A. and the combination 
plans from the viewpoint of both the employee and employer. 
P .E .R.A. 
From the avera~e employee's viewpoint, P.E.R.A. is a more than adequate 
retirement plan. Its retirement benefit formula provides a combination of 
both the social approach (minimum standards') and the career service approach 
to superannuation. · · 
The average employee who retires after 20 years pays, at the most, 
less than 30 per cent of his final annuity. He gets a very high return per 
dollar of contribution, and the contribution rate is not excessive. Early 
retirement is·another employee advantage. Survivorship and disability 
benefit.s are also included in the P.E.R.A. package. P.E.R.A. is completely 
controlled on the state level, by a board composed primarily of representatives 
of the system's membership. Policy decisions and benefit changes may be 
made without interference by or dependence on the national government. 
In respect to benefits for older employees with relatively few years 
of service, it can be argued that P.E.R.A. meets the employer's responsibility 
for that portion of working lifetime spent, in public service; any additional 
benefits would be unfair to career employees. Employees who leave covered 
service are entitled to refunds or deferred annuities if eligible, and 
temporary workers are entitled to P.E.R.A. coverage if they become permanent 
employees. 
The average employee evaluates a retirement program on the basis of 
what he contributes and receives. The employer looks at several aspects 
including the retirement plan's application to all employees, its cost, 
and the effect on personnel policies, recruitment, and retention. The 
question has been raised as to whether P.E.R.A. is a career service retirement 
program, since no credit is given for more than 20 years service. Early 
retirement is possible which could deprive the employer of skilled services 
during an employee's most productive period. If the retirement of older 
employees is deemed desirable or necessary, then perhaps the retirement· 
program should make some additional provision for these employees. The 
problem of minimum retirement benefits for older employees with few years 
of service becomes even more important if some sort of compulsory retirement 
is considered advantageous by the employer. The lack of retirement coverage 
under P.E.R.A. for the temporary or casual employee is also of importance 
to the employer. ·1ast, but not least, is the fact that the employer is 
paying 70 per cent or more of each employee's retirement benefit. 
Supplementation 
This is the most expensive of the combination plans. It provides the 
employee with double coverage for disability and survivorship benefits and 
adds O.A.S.D.I., retirement benefits at age 65 to the annuity provided by 
P.E.R.A., including the spouse's benefit if payable. It would not interfere 
with early retirement, except that failure to work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I. 
covered employment·upon such retirement would result in a lower O,A.S.D.I. 
primary benefit at age 65. Employees who plan to retire early (between 55 
and 60) and work in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment could receive as high 
an O.A.S.D.I, summary retirement benefit as they would um.er a full 
supplementation plan, if they had not been covered by O.A.S.D,I. prior 
to retirement from P.E.R.A. covered service, 
The basic objection to full supplementation is its cost and high 
contribution rate by both employer and employees. Older employees nearing 
retirement would benefit under full supplement~tion because of the addition 
of primary benefits, and it would provide minimum continuous coverage for 
transient employees, The employer would continue to contribute the same 
proportion of the P.E.R,A. annuity, in addition to a contribution equal 
to the employees' for O,A,S.D,I. Twenty years' service at age 65 would 
continue to be the standard for ma•ximum benefits. 
Offset 
This is the least costly of the combined plans, although more expensive 
than P.E.R.A. It provides the average employee with the same benefits he 
would receive um.er P.E.R.A. plus the spouse's benefit, if payable. It 
provides transient employees with continuous minimum retirement coverage. 
It does not interfere with early retirement as the employee's benefit will 
be the same before and after age 65, because the P.E.R.A. portion is decreased 
only by the amount of the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. For this reason it 
doesn't matter whether the employee works in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment 
between his early retirement and age 65. Under the other combination plans, 
with fixed formulae at age 65, any decrease in the O.A.S.D.I. primary annuity 
would result in a decrease in the total annuity. Older employees with 
limited service would benefit under the offset plan because they would have 
O.A.S,D.I. benefits to add to their minimum. P.E.R.A. benefits. 
The main objections to offset are: 1) P.E.R.A. would be closely integrated 
with O.A.S.D.I. to the extent that changes in O.A.S.D.I. would cause changes 
in P.E.R.A.; 2) upward revisions in O.A.S.D.I. benefits would not reflect 
in increased employee benefits, because P.E.R.A. benefits would be reduced 
proportionately; and 3) except for older workers and continuous minimum 
coverage for transient workers, none of the existing retirement problems are 
corrected. 
Coordination 
This method of combination provides at a higher cost benefits slightly 
in excess of current P.E.R.A. benefits plus the spouse's benefit, if payable. 
Earl;( retirement is still possible, but failure of the early-retired employee 
to work in O.A.S.D-.I. covered employment elsewhere until age 65 would result 
in a lower O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit and co.nsequently a lower total benefit 
at age 65. Older employees and transient employees would benefit more 
than they do at present under P.E.R.A. (which is true of all combination 
plans). The basic P.E.R.A. formula is retained, so that the coordinated 
plan does not answer the problem of career service, nor does it adjust 
employer-employee proportionate shares of total cost. 
New Retirement Plan 
This plan, based on 30 years service at age 65, places a greater 
proportion of the total cost on the employee (approximately 45 per cent) 
and discourages early retirement. Transient employees and older employees 
would benefit from O.A.S.D.I. coverage; in addition, transient employees 
would have their non O.A.S.D.I. contributions returned with interest. 
The new retirement plan gives the employer the opportunity to correct 
any existing dissatisfactions with P.E.R.A. Older employe~s would not have 
a voice in determining whether the plan should be set up, because the system 
can be established for all future employees; however, present employees 
could transfer, if they so desired. Career service is recognized through 
the 30-year base and the granting of additional. credit for years of service 
over and .above 30, with no limit. The new retirement plan costs would be 
in excess of P.E.R.A., but less than under any other combined plan except 
offset. 
Freezing of Earned Credits 
Freezing of earned credits is not a consideration under either full 
supplementation or the new retirement plan. Under full supplementation, 
O.A.S.D.I. is added to P.E.R.A., so credits earned are in effect already 
frozen. 1he new retirement plan could be set up for all new employees, 
and old employees would transfer only if their previous service as computed 
under the new plan formula plus O.A.S.D.I. benefits would exceed the 
expected annuity under P.E.R.A. 
Under the offset and coordinated plans, the freezing of earned credits 
bears serious consideration. If benefits are frozen, present employees will 
receive higher annuity benefits -- the amount being proportionate to the 
number of years of prior service. Consequently, it would be advantageious 
for most present employees -- especially those near retirement -- to transfer 
to a combined plan. The costs, as was shown, for the offset and coordinated 
plans would be higher with earned credits frozen, and present employees 
would receive higher benefits than employees entering covered service in 
the future. 
Even though it would be more costly, it may he desirable to freeze 
earned credits~ Employees are usually less reluctant to supp~r~ ~ combined 
plan under such circumstances and it -would eliminate the poss1b1.ll ty of 
law suits on the !?f"OUnds that retirement rights have been impaired. 
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IV 
RETIREMENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Six present retirement questions were.enumerated in Chapter I. In brief 
these include: 
1) the financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present 
accrued unfunded liabilities; 
2) the present financing by the employer of 70 to 75 per cent of each 
retirement annuity; 
3) the lack of retirement coverage for temporary, part-time, and some full-
time employees; 
4) the dissatisfaction with P.E.R.A. expressed by three member cities and 
their employees; 
5) the employees entering P.E.R.A.-covered service at an advanced age, 
especially in low salary jobs, who are eligible only for small retirement annuities; 
and 
6) the question as to whether P.E.R.A. is a career service retirement plan. 
P.E.R.A. 
Slould the decision be made not to combine P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I., there are 
several things which might be done concerning these problems within the framework 
of P.E.R.A. 
1) Accrued Unfunded Liability. The employer's contribution rate could be 
raised to meet the interest requirement on the unfunded liability and the employers 
rate could be increased to amortize the unfunded liability over a period of years. 
It would necessitate a contribution rate increase of .7 per cent in the state fund 
and ·.52 per cent in the school fund to pay the interest on the unfunded liability. 
If a decision were made to amortize the unfunded liability over a period of 35 years, 
it would necessitate an employer contribution increase of 1.98 per cent to 7.98 per 
cent in the state division, and one of .99 per cent to 6.99 per cent in the school 
division. 
Any rate increase would necessitate a change in the statutory provision for 
employer's contributions. If the intent is to meet the interest only on the unfunded 
liability, legislation must be considered which would tie the employers' contribution 
rates to the actuarial valuation so that the rate could be adjusted automatically 
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2) Employee's Proportion of Hetiremcnt Cos ts. If the General Assembly decides 
that the employee should pay a greater proportion of the cost of his annuity, one of 
two things could be done. First, the employee's contribution rate could be increased 
to more nearly approximate the amount necessary to finance 50 per cent of the annuity. 
This would correspond to the erroneous impression currently held by some people that 
the fact that both the .employer and employee are contributing six per cent of salary 
n1eans that the employee is presently paying half the cost of his annuity. The second 
alternative would require a 30 year career base, instead of the existing 20 year base, 
in order to qualify for. a full retirement annuity. 
3) Lack of Coverage for Some Employees. This is really two problems. One can 
be solved by inserting penalties in P.E.R.A. legislation for failure to cover all full-
time permanent employees. If a decision is made to provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage for 
those employees not eligible for P.E.R.A., an amendment to the state O.A.S.D.I. . 1 
enabling legislation would be needed to extend these statutes to cover such employees. 
Then, the present agreement with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
could be modified in line with the amended state legislation to provide O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage for temporary and part-time employees. If this is done a question arises as 
to the continuation of O.A.S.D.I. coverage for those temporary and part-time employees 
who may eventually become permanent employees eligible for P.E.R.A. If O.A.S.D.I. 
coverage is continued, the contribution rates will be higher for both employer am 
employee or equal to the costs of full supplementation. This means that the state 
will be contributing more for a few employees and that a few employees will receive 
greater benefits than =the rest. On the other hand, if O.A.S.D.I. coverage is 
terminated for those temporary and part-time employees who become eligible for P.E.R.A. 
coverage, there is a question as to the advantage in providing O.A.S.D.I. coverage for 
them in the first place. 
4) The Three Cities. In order to allow Arvada, Fort Morgan, and Gunnison to 
drop P.E.R.A. coverage and replace it with O.A.S.D.I., the following steps would have 
to be taken: 
First, amend the state 1s enabling legislation to specify each of the cities as 
a separate retirement plan and to permit a referendum of employees to be held in each 
city that so desired to determine whether they want O.A.S.D.I. coverage in addition 
to P.E.R.A. Then, further state legislation would be needed to allow the employees 
of each of these cities to hold a second referendum to drop P.E.R.A. coverage. If 
this were done, these cities could achieve their objective of substituting O.A.S.D.I. 
for P.E.R.A. '!here appears to be no other way, because of the provisions of Section 
218 of the Social Security Act as amended, in which P .E.R.A. can· be replaced by 
O.A.S.D.I. coverage. Section 218 states that public employees whose positions were 
covered by a retirement system as of January 1, 1954 cannot obtain O.A.S.D.I. unless 
a referendum is held even if these employees are no longer members. Therefore, if 
P.E.R.A. coverage were dropped first in these cities, there would be no retirement 
system members to vote for O.A.S.D.I. coverage. 
1. 111-7-1 and following, CS 1957 to CRS 1953. 
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The procedures outlined above create additional problems, however. Very few 
employees in Fort Morgan and Gunnison have been enrolled as members of P.E.R.A., so 
that these few would be determining the fate of the rest, unless ,these cities 
enrolled additional employees prior to the first referendum. A decision would have 
to be made as to what should be done about the service credits earned by employees 
in these cities who are _ presently covered by P.E.R.A. One possibility would be the 
provision of a deferred annuity with refunds to those employees who either are not 
eligible for a deferred annuitt or do not wish to avail themselves of it. It is 
important that some sort of agreement be reached with these employees to avoid any 
lawsuits claiming impairment of benefits arising from the two referenda. 
5) Older Employees with Limited Covered Service. Unless the P.E.R.A. formula 
is drastically altered, there is no way within the framework of the existing retire-
ment system and within sound financing practice in which additional benefits or 
coverage could be provided for current older employees nearing retirement with but 
a few years of coverage under P.E.R.A. This would become an increasing. problem, if 
some method of mandatory retirement after age 65 were considered desirable personnel 
policy. In the future this might be remedied by reviewing hiring policies of the 
state government. 
6) Career Service Aspects of P.E.R.A. P.E.R.A.'s formula could be changed 
to a 30-year plan with the granting of additional credit for any years of employment 
over 30. This would also result in the employees' paying a larger portion of their 
retirement annuities. Early retirement could be discouraged by providing that 
employees would receive only the actuarial equivalent of what they would be entitled 
to at age 65 for the same number of years of service. These changes would produce a 
plan similar to the new retirement plan, except that O.A.S.D.I. coverage and benefits 
would not be combined with P.E.R.A. Legislation would be necessary to make these 
changes, but they could be made without any vote of the present P.E.R.A. membership. 
The new formula would apply to all new employees and for the future service of 
present employees. 
All Combination Plans Except the New Retirement Plan. 
First, the basic decision must be made as to whether P.E.R.A. should be divided 
into two parts: one combined with O.A.S.D.I. and the other, P.E.R.A. alone. If it 
is decided that a dual system is not wanted, there will be no need to have Colorado 
added to the states listed in Section 218 of the Social Security Act as allowed to 
have a dual retirement system. If the General Assembly decides to maintain only one 
plan, but that one to be a combination plan, all that would be required is amendment 
of the present enabling legislation to provide for a referendum and a selection by 
the General Assembly of the form of combination:: full supplementation, offset, or 
coordination. If either the offset or coordination method is selected, a further 
decision would have to be made as -to whether or not to freeze earned credits. The 
importance of qualified actuarial and leg8:l assistance ip drawing up the enablins:-
legislation cannot be stressed too strongly. Actuarially and legally sound enabling 
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Under the prov1s1ons of Section 218 of the Social Security Act, the following 
portions of P.E.R.A. membership may be deemed separate retirement systems:: state 
employees; state patrol; judges; school employees (either as a group or each school 
district separately); municipal employees (either as a group or each city separately}; 
and each institution of higher learning. The state patrol could be excluded from the 
referendum under the provisions of Section 218 which exclude police and firemen 
unless inclusion of these portions is expressly requested by a state. This means 
that the state patrol would maintain its present retirement system. 
A possible arranr,ement for Colorado under this provision would appear to be 
the establishment of the following as separate retirement systems for referendum 
purposes: state employees, highway patrol, judges, school employees, each municipality, 
and each institution of higher learning. This breakdown would give the membership of 
each municipality and college the opportunity of deciding for itself whether to 
combine, without having the larger membership of certain municipalities and colleges 
decide the fate of combination for the whole group. It would also make it possible 
for the state division and school division to vote independently, am the vote of 
their large ~emberships would not decide the fate of combination for the municipalities 
• and colleges. 
Split System. 
Serious thought should be given, however, to having Colorado added to the list 
of states which may have a divided retireDJent system. The chief disadvantage would 
be the burden of administerin~ a number of separate retirement systems. The advantages 
appear to outweigh the disadvantages, however. Each employee would be able to choose 
the combination plan or to retain membership in P.E.R.A., according to which would be 
best for him. The majority could choose the plan it wished without affecting the 
desires of the minority. With a divided system there would be no need for freezing 
earned credits, because an employee would not have to transfer to the combination 
plan unless it was to his advantage, meaning that P.E.R.A. benefits recomputed 
according to the combined plan formula plus O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be greater 
than the expected benefits under P.E.R.A • 
It would also solve the impairment of benefits problem for the three cities 
that wish to substitute O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A. The employees of these three 
municipalities who wished to retain their P.E.R.A. coverage would be permitted to do so. 
Colorado's Congressional delegation would have to be contacted immediately so 
that Colorado could be added to the dual-system states through legislation passed at 
this session of Congress. The state enabling legislation would have to be passed at 
this session of the 42nd General Assembly to become effective upon the change in 
federal legislation. These immediate steps are necessary to insure that an agreement 
modification can be signed with the Secretary of Health, Fducation, and Welfare prior 
to December 31, 1959, so that O.A.S.D.I. benefits can be backdated to January 1, 1956 • 
It is suggested that the same portions of P.E.R.A. mentioned above be deemed separate 
retirement systems for the holding of dual-system referenda, namely:: the state division, 
state patrol, judges, school division, each municipality, and each institution of 
higher learning. 
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1. Accrued Unfunded Liability. Under a combined plan set up by either method 
outlined above, handling of the accrued unfunded liability would be the same as 
under P.E.R,A. without combination. 
2. Emplo~•er's Proportion of Retirement Costs. Any combination of P.E.R.A. as 
presently constituted and O.A,S.D.I. would leave the proportion of retirement 
costs for emplc,yer and employee approximately the same as. at present. 
3. Lack of Coverage for Some Employees. Provision of 0,A.S.D.I. coverage for 
part-time and temporary employees, as outlined in the section above on P.E.R.A., 
would dovetail with a combined plan in that temporary and part-time employees 
who became permanent and eligible for retirement coverage under the combined plan 
would be able to continue their O.A.S.D.I. coverage, along with other permanent 
employees. 
4. The Three Cities. The same procedure could be followed as outlined in the 
section on P.E.R.A. above. With a dual system, the cities would run little risk 
of impairment of benefit suits, because these employees would be able to stay 
under P.E.-R.A, 
5. Older Employees with Limited Coverage •. The provision of O.A.S.D.I. through 
a combined plan would make it possible for older employees to receive greater 
benefits, because of the addition of the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, as well as the 
spouse's benefit, if payable. This would make it easier to develop a plan for 
compulsory retirement, if such is considered desirable. 
6. Career Service Aspects of P.E.R.A. The adoption of a combination plan would 
make early retirement less attractive; however, all present employees under a two-
part system could retain membership in P.E.R.A. and retire prior to age 65 as at 
present. The 20 year basis for maximum.retirement benefits at age 65 would remain 
unchanged for current P.E.R.A. members. 
The New Retirement Plan 
In order to set up the new retirement plan it would be necessary to have 
Colorado added to the list of dual retirement system states. Again, it is impor:tant 
that this be done during the present session of Congress and that this session of 
the 42nd General Assembly pass enabling legislation contingent upon the change in 
the Social Security Act. Unless this is done, the O.A.S.D.I. coverar,e agreement 
cannot be signed in time to backdate O.A.S.D.I. to January 1, 1956. 
It would be possible to set up the new retirement plan after January 1, 1960, 
even though O.A.S.D.I. coverage could not be backdated. If this were done, however, 
any present employees who transferred to the new plan would suffer a loss in the 
O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, because of the lack of coverage between January 1, 1956, 
and the signing of the coverage agreement. It would have no effect on the new 
employees, who would automatically become members of the new retirement plan. 
In either case, present employees would have the opportunity to decide in a 
referendum whether to transfer from P.E.R.A. to the new retirement plan. F..arned 
credits would not be frozen, and each present emplo;yee would have to determine 
whether his expected benefits under the present plan would be greater than the 
combined benefits under the new retirement plan, with credits already earned 












1. Accrued Unfunded Liability. The unfunded liability could be handled 
in the same way as under P.E.R.A. or the other combined plans. 
2. Employer's Share of Retirement Costs. As the new retirement plan is 
based on 30 years' service at age 65, instead of 20, the employer's share of the 
cost of each annuity would be decreased to approximately 55-60 per cent. 
3. Lack of Coverage for Some Emplotees. o.A.S.D.l. coverage for temporary 
employees would dovetail with the new ret rement plan in the same way as with the 
other combined plans. 
4. '!he Three Cities. '!his problem could be handled in the same way as with 
the other combined plans um.er a two-part retirement system. 
5. Older Employees with Limited Coverage. The new retirement plan has the 
same advantages for older employees with limited service as · the other combined plans. 
6. Career Service Aspects of P. E .R .A. The adoption of the new retirement 
plan is one method of combination by which a career service retirement system can 
be established. Retirement benefits would be geared to 30 years' service at age 65, 
with additional benefits for years of service iri excess of 30. Even though 30 
years is the standard, it is possible to get a substantial retirement benefit for 
20 or 25 years' service at age 65, especially for those employees whose final 
average salary is $4,800 or less. Early retirement would still be possible, but 
would be discouraged because the monthly retirement benefit received would be the 
actuarial equivalent of the benefit paid at age 65 for the same number of years 
of service. An employee with 30 years' service who-retired at age 55 would 
receive a monthly annuity approximately 47 per cent as large as he would have 
received for the same number of years' service at age 65. If he retired at age 
60, his monthly annuity would be approximately two-thirds as large as it would 
have been at age 65 for the same number of years' service. When these early-
retirinP, employees reach age 65, O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be added, but the 
new retirement plan annuity would remain the same. · 
